F. Bente - Historical Introductions. The Father of Synergism

154. The Father of Synergism.

During the first period of his activity in Wittenberg, Melanchthon was

in perfect agreement with Luther also on the question of man's inability

in spiritual matters and the sole activity, or monergism, of grace in

the work of his salvation. As late as 1530 he incorporated these views

in the _Augsburg Confession,_ as appears, in particular, from Articles

II, V, XVIII, and XIX. His later doctrine concerning the three

concurring causes of conversion (the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the

consenting will of man), as well as his theory explaining

synergistically, from an alleged dissimilar action in man, the

difference why some are saved while others are lost, is not so much as

hinted at in the Confession. But even at this early date (1530) or soon

after, Melanchthon also does not seem any longer to have agreed

whole-heartedly with Luther in the doctrine of grace and free will. And

in the course of time his theology drifted farther and farther from its

original monergistic moorings. Nor was Luther wholly unaware of the

secret trend of his colleague and friend toward--Erasmus. In 1536, when

the deviations of Melanchthon and Cruciger, dealt with in our previous

chapter, were brought to his notice, Luther exclaimed: "_Haec est

ipsissima theologia Erasmi._ This is the identical theology of Erasmus,

nor can there be anything more opposed to our doctrine." (Kolde,

_Analecta,_ 266.)

That Melanchthon's theology was verging toward Erasmus appears from his

letter of June 22, 1537, to Veit Dietrich, in which he said that he

desired a more thorough exposition also of the doctrines of

predestination and of the _consent of the will._ (_C. R._ 3, 383.)

Before this, in his _Commentary on Romans_ of 1532, he had written that

there is some cause of election also in man; _viz._, in as far as he

does not repudiate the grace offered--"_tamen eatenus aliquam causam in

accipiente esse quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat_." (Seeberg 4,

442.) In an addition to his _Loci_ of 1533 he also spoke of a cause of

justification and election residing in man. (_C. R._ 21, 332.) In the

revised editions of 1535 and 1543 he plainly began to prepare the way

for his later bold and unmistakable deviations. For even though unable

to point out a clean-cut and unequivocal synergistic statement, one

cannot read these editions without scenting a Semi-Pelagian and Erasmian

atmosphere. What Melanchthon began to teach was the doctrine that man,

when approached by the Word of God, is able to assume either an attitude

of _pro_ or _con_, _i.e._, for or against the grace of God. The same

applies to the _Variata_ of 1540 in which the frequent "_adiuvari_"

there employed, though not incorrect as such, was not without a

synergistic flavor.

Tschackert remarks of the _Loci_ of 1535: "Melanchthon wants to make man

responsible for his state of grace. Nor does the human will in

consequence of original sin lose the ability to decide itself when

incited; the will produces nothing new by its own power, but assumes an

attitude toward what approaches it. When man hears the Word of God, and

the Holy Spirit produces spiritual affections in his heart, the will can

either assent or turn against it. In this way Melanchthon arrives at the

formula, ever after stereotype with him, that there are three concurring

causes in the process of conversion: 'the Word of God, the Holy Spirit,

and the human will, which, indeed, is not idle, _but strives against its

infirmity.'_" (520.)

However, during the life of Luther, Melanchthon made no further

measurable progress towards synergism. Perhaps the unpleasant

experiences following upon his innovations in the doctrine of good works

acted as a check also on the public development of his synergistic

tendencies. During Luther's life Melanchthon, as he himself admitted to

Carlowitz (106), dissimulated, keeping his deviating views to himself

and his intimate friends. After Luther's death, however, he came out

unmistakably and publicly, also in favor of synergism, endorsing even

the Erasmian definition of free will as "the power in man to apply

himself to grace." He plainly taught that, when drawn by the Holy

Spirit, the will is able to decide _pro_ or _con,_ to obey or to resist.

Especially in his lectures, Melanchthon--not indeed directly, but

mentioning the name of Flacius--continually lashed such phrases of

Luther as "purely passive," "block," "resistance,"--a fact to which

Schluesselburg, who had studied in Wittenberg, refers in support of his

assertion that Melanchthon had departed from Luther's teaching on free

will. (_Catalogus_ 5, 32.) While Melanchthon formerly (in his _Loci_ of

1543) had spoken of three causes of a good action (_bonae actionis_) he

now publicly advocated the doctrine of three concurring causes of

_conversion._ Now he boldly maintained that, since the grace of God is

universal, one must assume, and also teach, that there are different

actions in different men, which accounts for the fact that some are

converted and saved while others are lost. According to the later

Melanchthon, therefore, man's eternal salvation evidently does not

depend on the gracious operations of God's Holy Spirit and Word alone,

but also on his own correct conduct toward grace. In his heart,

especially when approaching the mercy-seat in prayer, Melanchthon, no

doubt, forgot and disavowed his own teaching, and believed and practised

Luther's _sola-gratia_-doctrine. But it cannot be denied that, in his

endeavors to harmonize universal grace with the fact that not all, but

some only, are saved, Melanchthon repudiated the monergism of Luther,

espoused and defended the powers of free will in spiritual matters, and

thought, argued, spoke, and wrote in terms of synergism. Indeed,

Melanchthon must be regarded as the father of both synergism and the

rationalistic methods employed in its defense, and as the true father

also of the modern rationalistico-synergistic theology represented by

such distinguished men as Von Hofmann, Thomasius, Kahnis, Luthardt, etc.

(Pieper 2, 582; Frank 1, 231.)

155. Unsound Statements of Melanchthon.

Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of

Melanchthon: In the _Loci_ of 1535 the so-called human cause of

conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as

endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do

not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the

endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary,

since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the

Word of God, but strive to obey it.... We see that these causes are

united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not

idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical

writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: 'Only will, and

God will precede,' God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but let us

beware lest we resist.... Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who

is willing." (_C. R._ 21, 376.)

In conversion and salvation God certainly must do and does His share,

but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is

also the impression received from Melanchthon's statements in the third

elaboration of his _Loci,_ 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good

action concur (_hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis_): the Word

of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will assenting to and not

resisting the Word of God (_humana voluntas assentiens, nec repugnans

Verbo Dei_). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of

his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does

not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit

assisting, endeavors to assent,--in such a struggle the will is not

inactive (_in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa_). The ancients have

said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows.

So also Basil says: '_Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta_, Only will,

and God anticipates. God precedes, calls, moves, assists us; but as for

us, let us see to it that we do not resist. _Deus antevertit nos, vocat,

movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,_' (21, 658.) And Phil.

1, 6: 'He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the

day of Jesus Christ,' _i.e._, we are assisted by God (_adiuvamur a

Deo_), but we must hear the Word of God and not resist the drawing God."

(916.) "God draws our minds that they will, but we must assent, not

resist. _Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed assentiri nos, non repugnare

oportet._" (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when

assisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. _Fit autem voluntas

adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera._" (663.) Frank comments

pertinently that the _magis_ presupposes a certain degree of liberty of

the will before the assistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)

The boldest synergistic statements are found in the _Loci_ of 1548. It

was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was

embodied as follows: "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a

block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (_C.

R._ 7, 51. 260.) As to the _Loci_ of this year, Bindseil remarks in the

_Corpus Reformatorum:_ "This edition is famous on account of certain

paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these

additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the

faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon

was charged with synergism by the Flacians.... For this reason the

edition is called by J. T. Mayer 'the worst of all (_omnium pessima_).'"

At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify

himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (_facultas

applicandi se ad gratiam_) as found in one of these sections. When

Flacius quoted the passage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not

defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition

[1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend

it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked:

"The _Loci Communes_ of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the

_locus de libero arbitrio_ must confess, even if he judges most mildly,

that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four

paragraphs which were inserted after Luther's death? For here we read:

'There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is

rejected, a David received.'" (Pieper 2, 587.)

From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in

David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free

will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the

promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does

something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken

away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word,

he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (_C. R._ 21, 659.) Again: "I

therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that

free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and

immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you

hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is

that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented

to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can

(_immo aliquo modo potes_), and when you sustain yourself with the voice

of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the

Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this

manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle

with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious

affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that

free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (_liberum

arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam_); _i.e._,

he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against

conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore

between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These

matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered.

For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory

wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference

why Saul is rejected and David is received; _i.e._, there must of

necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. _Cum promissio sit

universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in

nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David

recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his

duobus._ Properly understood, this is true, and the use [_usus_] in the

exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in

the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of

causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (_C. R._ 21,

659f.)

At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is

reported to have said that the passage in his _Loci_ of 1548 defining

free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the

regenerated will (_voluntas renata_), as, he said, appeared from the

context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact,

however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the

passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in

conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly

confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying

that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving

against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from

that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply

itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar

actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability

accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such

was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but

which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new

edition of his _Loci._ For all, including the last one to appear during

his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by

the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all

subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (_C. R._ 21, 570.)

The sections which were added to the _Loci_ after 1548 also breathe the

same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which

says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or

resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in

the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to

govern his motions, _i.e._, he can enjoin upon his external members such

actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he

cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart

without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when

the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. _Cum autem

trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare._" (21, 1078; 13,

162.)

Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his _Loci_ of

1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (_bonae

actionis_), Melanchthon, in his _Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni_ of 1550,

substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these

causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will

of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with

trepidation, assents. _Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus

Sanctus ... vox Evangelii ... et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat

voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur_." Again: "And

concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the

assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but

he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and

there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in

a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of

the will (_tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio_)." "God therefore

begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is

willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from

the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God

always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (_auxilium Dei semper

initio et deinceps concurrere_)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely

concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the

third. In his _Examen Ordinandorum_ of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced

the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these

causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son

send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the

Word of God (_et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo

Dei_). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both

preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the

promise of grace.... Let us therefore not resist but assent to the

promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come

to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his _Opinion on the

Weimar Book of Confutation,_ March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again,

if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred

that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the

consolation. _Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist

dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen

Geist, so er den Trost annimmt._" (9, 768.)

W. Preger is right when he says: "According to Melanchthon's view,

natural man is able to do the following [when the Word of God is

preached to him]: he is able not to resist; he is able to take pains

with respect to obedience; he is able to comfort himself with the

Word.... This [according to Melanchthon] is a germ of the positive good

will still found in natural man which prevenient grace arouses."

(_Flacius Illyricus_ 2, 189 f.) Schmauk writes: Melanchthon found "the

cause for the actual variation in the working of God's grace in man, its

object. This subtle synergistic spirit attacks the very foundation of

Lutheranism, flows out into almost every doctrine, and weakens the

Church at every point. And it was particularly this weakness which the

great multitude of Melanchthon's scholars, who became the leaders of the

generation of which we are speaking, absorbed, and which rendered it

difficult to return, finally, after years of struggle, to the solid

ground, once more recovered in the _Formula of Concord._" (_Conf.

Principle,_ 601.)

R. Seeberg characterizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "A

synergistic trait therefore appears in his doctrine. In the last

analysis, God merely grants the outer and inner possibility of obtaining

salvation. Without man's cooperation this possibility would not become

reality; and he is able to refuse this cooperation. It is, therefore, in

conversion equally a cause with the others. _Sie [die Mitwirkung des

Menschen] ist also freilich eine den andern Ursachen gleichberechtigte

Ursache in der Bekehrung._" God makes conversion possible, but only the

decision of man's free will makes it actual,--such, according to

Seeberg, was the "synergism" of Melanchthon. (Seeberg, _Dogg.,_ 4, 444.

446.)

Frank says of Melanchthon's way of solving the question why some are

converted and saved while others are lost: "The road chosen by

Melanchthon has indeed led to the goal. The contradictions are solved.

But let us look where we have landed. We are standing--in the Roman

camp!" After quoting a passage from the _Tridentinum,_ which speaks of

conversion in terms similar to those employed by Melanchthon, Frank

continues: "The foundation stone of Luther's original Reformation

doctrine of salvation by grace alone; _viz._, that nothing in us, not

even our will moved and assisted by God, is the _causa meritoria_ of

salvation, is subverted by these propositions; and it is immaterial to

the contrite heart whether much or little is demanded from free will as

the faculty of applying oneself to grace." Frank adds: "What the

Philippists, synchronously [with Melanchthon] and later, propounded

regarding this matter [of free will] are but variations of the theme

struck by Melanchthon. Everywhere the sequence of thought is the same,

with but this difference, that here the faults of the Melanchthonian

theory together with its consequences come out more clearly." (1, 134f.)

The same is true of modern synergistic theories. Without exception they

are but variations of notes struck by Melanchthon,--the father of all

the synergists that have raised their heads within the Lutheran Church.

156. Pfeffinger Champions Synergistic Doctrine.

Prior to 1556 references to the unsound position of the Wittenberg and

Leipzig theologians are met with but occasionally. (Planck 4, 568.) The

unmistakably synergistic doctrine embodied in the _Loci_ of 1548, as

well as in the Leipzig Interim, did not cause alarm and attract

attention immediately. But when, in 1555, John Pfeffinger [born 1493;

1539 superintendent, and 1543 professor in Leipzig; assisted 1548 in

framing the Leipzig Interim; died January 1, 1573] published his "Five

Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will--_De Libertate

Voluntatis Humanae Quaestiones Quinque._ D. Johannes Pfeffinger Lipsiae

Editae in Officina Georgii Hantschi 1555," the controversy flared up

instantly. It was a little booklet containing besides a brief

introduction, only 41 paragraphs, or theses. In these Pfeffinger

discussed and defended the synergistic doctrine of Melanchthon,

maintaining that in conversion man, too, must contribute his share

though it be ever so little.

Early in the next year Pfeffinger was already opposed by the theologians

of Thuringia, the stanch opponents of the Philippists, John Stolz,

court-preacher at Weimar composing 110 theses for this purpose. In 1558

Amsdorf published his _Public Confession of the True Doctrine of the

Gospel and Confutation of the Fanatics of the Present Time,_ in which

he, quoting from memory, charged Pfeffinger with teaching that man is

able to prepare himself for grace by the natural powers of his free

will, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and their

disciples, had held. (Planck 4, 573. 568.) About the same time Stolz

published the 110 theses just referred to with a preface by Aurifaber

(_Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio_). Flacius,

then professor in Jena, added his _Refutation of Pfeffinger's

Propositions on Free Will_ and _Jena Disputation on Free Will._ In the

same year, 1558, Pfeffinger, in turn published his _Answer to the Public

Confession of Amsdorf,_ charging the latter with falsification, and

denouncing Flacius as the "originator and father of all the lies which

have troubled the Lutheran Church during the last ten years." But at the

same time Pfeffinger showed unmistakably that the charges of his

opponents were but too well founded. Says Planck: "Whatever may have

moved Pfeffinger to do so, he could not (even if Flacius himself had

said it for him) have confessed synergism more clearly and more

definitely than he did spontaneously and unasked in this treatise." (4,

574.) Frank: "Pfeffinger goes beyond Melanchthon and Strigel; for the

action here demanded of, and ascribed to, the natural will is, according

to him, not even in need of liberation by prevenient grace.... His

doctrine may without more ado be designated as Semi-Pelagianism." (1,

137.)

At Wittenberg, Pfeffinger was supported by George Major, Paul Eber, and

Paul Crell and before long his cause was espoused also by Victorin

Strigel in Jena. Disputations by the Wittenberg and Leipzig synergists

(whom Schluesselburg, 5, 16, calls "cooperators" and "die freiwilligen

Herren") and by their opponents in Jena increased the animosity. Both

parties cast moderation to the winds. In a public letter of 1558 the

Wittenberg professors, for example, maligned Flacius in every possible

way, and branded him as "der verloffene undeutsche Flacius Illyricus"

and as the sole author of all the dissensions in the churches of

Germany. (Planck 4, 583.)

157. Statements of Pfeffinger.

Following are some of the synergistic deliverances made by Pfeffinger in

his _Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will._ Par. 11

reads: "Thirdly, when we inquire concerning the spiritual actions, it is

correct to answer that the human will has not such a liberty as to be

able to effect the spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit

(_humanam voluntatem non habere eiusmodi libertatem, ut motus

spirituales sine auxilio Spiritus Sancti efficere possit_)." Par. 14:

"Therefore some assent or apprehension on our part must concur (_oportet

igitur nostram aliquam assensionem seu apprehensionem concurrere_) when

the Holy Spirit has aroused (_accenderit_) the mind, the will and the

heart. Hence Basil says: Only will, and God anticipates; and Chrysostom:

He who draws, draws him who is willing; and Augustine: He assists those

who have received the gift of the call with becoming piety, and preserve

the gifts of God as far as man is able. Again: When grace precedes, the

will follows--_praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate._" In Par. 16 we

read: "The will, therefore, is not idle, but assents faintly. _Voluntas

igitur non est otiosa sed languide assentitur._"

Paragraph 17 runs: "If the will were idle or purely passive, there would

be no difference between the pious and the wicked, or between the elect

and the damned, as, between Saul and David, between Judas and Peter. God

would also become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in

the wicked and damned; and to God would be ascribed contradictory wills,

--which conflicts with the entire Scripture. Hence it follows that there

is in us a cause why some assent while others do not. _Sequitur ergo in

nobis esse aliquam causam, cur alii assentiantur, alii non

assentiantur_." Par. 24: "Him [the Holy Spirit], therefore, we must not

resist; but on the part of our will, which is certainly not like a stone

or block, some assent must be added--_sed aliquam etiam assensionem

accedere nostrae voluntatis, quam non sicut saxum aut incudem se habere

certum est._" Par. 30: "But apprehension on our part must concur. For,

since the promise of grace is universal, and since we must obey this

promise, some difference between the elect and the rejected must be

inferred from our will (_sequitur, aliquod discrimen inter electos et

reiectos a voluntate nostra sumendum esse_), _viz._, that those who

resist the promise are rejected, while those who embrace the promise are

received.... All this clearly shows that our will is not idle in

conversion or like a stone or block in its conduct. _Ex quibus omnibus

manifestissimum apparet, voluntatem nostram non esse otiosam in

conversione, aut se ut saxum aut incudem habere._"

Par. 34 reads: "Some persons, however, shout that the assistance of the

Holy Spirit is extenuated and diminished if even the least particle be

attributed to the human will. Though this argument may appear specious

and plausible, yet pious minds understand that by our doctrine--

according to which we ascribe some cooperation to our will; _viz._, some

assent and apprehension (_qua tribuimus aliquam SYNERGIAM voluntati

nostrae, videlicet qualemcumque assensionem et apprehensionem_)--

absolutely nothing is taken away from the assistance rendered by the

Holy Spirit. For we affirm that the first acts (_primas partes_) must be

assigned and attributed to Him who first and primarily, through the Word

or the voice of the Gospel, moves our hearts to believe, to which

thereupon we, too, ought to assent as much as we are able (_cui deinde

et NOS, QUANTUM IN NOBIS EST, ASSENTIRI oportet_), and not resist the

Holy Spirit, but submit to the Word, ponder, learn, and hear it, as

Christ says: 'Whosoever hath heard of the Father and learned, cometh to

Me.'" Par. 36: "And although original sin has brought upon our nature a

ruin so sad and horrible that we can hardly imagine it, yet we must not

think that absolutely all the knowledge (_notitiae_) which was found in

the minds of our first parents before the Fall has on that account been

destroyed and extinguished after the Fall, or that the human will does

not in any way differ from a stone or a block; for we are, as St. Paul

has said most seriously, coworkers with God, which coworking, indeed, is

assisted and strengthened by the Holy Spirit--_sumus synergi Dei, quae

quidem synergia adiuvatur a Spiritu Sancto et confirmatur._" Evidently

no comment is necessary to show that the passages cited from Pfeffinger

are conceived, born, and bred in Semi-Pelagianism and rationalism.

Planck furthermore quotes from Pfeffinger's _Answer to Amsdorf,_ 1558:

"And there is no other reason why some are saved and some are damned

than this one alone, that some, when incited by the Holy Spirit, do not

resist, but obey Him and accept the grace and salvation offered, while

others will not accept it, but resist the Holy Spirit, and despise the

grace." (4, 578.) Again: "Although the will cannot awaken or incite

itself to spiritually good works, but must be awakened and incited

thereto by the Holy Ghost, yet man is not altogether excluded from such

works of the Holy Ghost, as if he were not engaged in it and were not to

contribute his share to it--_dass er nicht auch dabei sein und das Seine

nicht auch dabei tun muesse._" (576.) Again: In the hands of the Holy

Spirit man is not like a block or stone in the hands of a sculptor,

which do not and cannot "know, understand, or feel what is done with

them, nor in the least further or hinder what the artist endeavors to

make of them." (576.) "But when the heart of man is touched, awakened,

and moved by the Holy Ghost, man must not be like a dead stone or block,

... but must obey and follow Him. And although he perceives his great

weakness, and, on the other hand, how powerfully sin in his flesh

opposes, he must nevertheless not desist, but ask and pray God for grace

and assistance against sin and flesh." (577.) Planck remarks: According

to Pfeffinger, the powers for all this are still found in natural man,

and the only thing required is, not to recreate them, but merely to

incite them to action. (579.)

In 1558, in an appendix to his disputation of 1555, Pfeffinger explained

and illustrated his position, in substance, as follows: I was to prove

nothing else than that some use of the will [in spiritual matters] was

left, and that our nature is not annihilated or extinguished, but

corrupted and marvelously depraved after the Fall. Now, to be sure, free

will cannot by its own natural powers regain its integrity nor rise

after being ruined, yet as the doctrine [the Gospel] can be understood

by paying attention to it, so it can also in a manner (_aliquo modo_) be

obeyed by assenting to it. But it is necessary for all who would dwell

in the splendor of the eternal light and in the sight of God to look up

to and not turn away from, the light. Schluesselburg adds: "_Haec certe

est synergia_--This is certainly synergism." (_Catalogus_ 5, 161.)

Tschackert summarizes Pfeffinger's doctrine as follows: "When the Holy

Spirit, through the Word of God, influences a man, then the assenting

will becomes operative as a factor of conversion. The reason why some

assent while others do not must be in themselves.... Evidently

Pfeffinger's opinion was that not only the regenerate, but even the

natural will of man possesses the ability either to obey the divine

Spirit or to resist Him." (521.) According to W. Preger, Pfeffinger

taught "that the Holy Spirit must awaken and incite our nature that it

may understand, think, will and do what is right and pleasing to God,"

but that natural free will is able "to obey and follow" the motions of

the Spirit. (2, 192. 195.)

No doubt, Pfeffinger advocated, and was a candid exponent and champion

of, nothing but the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon,

according to which God never fails to do His share in conversion, while

we must beware (_sed nos viderimus, C. R._ 21, 658) lest we fail to do

our share. Pfeffinger himself made it a special point to cite

Melanchthon as his authority in this matter. The last (41st) paragraph

in his _Five Questions_ begins as follows: "We have briefly set forth

the doctrine concerning the liberty of the human will, agreeing with the

testimonies of the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures, a fuller

explanation of which students may find in the writings of our preceptor,

Mr. Philip (_prolisciorem explicationem requirant studiosi in scriptis

D. Philippi, praeceptoris nostri_)." And when, in the subsequent

controversy Pfeffinger was publicly assailed by Amsdorf, Flacius, and

others, everybody knew that their real target was none other than--

Master Philip. Melanchthon, too, was well aware of this fact. In his

_Opinion on the Weimar Confutation,_ of March 9, 1559, in which the

synergism of the Philippists is extensively treated, he said: "As to

free will, it is apparent that they attack me, Philip, in particular."

(_C. R._ 9, 763.)

158. Strigel and Huegel Entering Controversy.

The synergistic controversy received new zest and a new impetus when, in

1559, Victorin Strigel and Huegel (Hugelius), respectively professor and

pastor at Jena, the stronghold of the opponents of the Wittenberg

Philippists, opposed Flacius, espoused the cause of Pfeffinger,

championed the doctrine of Melanchthon, and refused to endorse the so

called _Book of Confutation_ which Flacius had caused to be drafted

particularly against the Wittenberg Philippists and Synergists, and to

be introduced. The situation thus created was all the more sensational

because, in the preceding controversies, Strigel had, at least

apparently, always sided with the opponents of the Philippists.

The "_Konfutationsbuch_--Book of Confutation and Condemnations of the

Chief Corruptions, Sects, and Errors Breaking in and Spreading at this

Time" was published in 1559 by Duke John Frederick II as a doctrinal

norm of his duchy. In nine chapters this Book, a sort of forerunner of

the _Formula of Concord,_ dealt with the errors 1. of Servetus, 2. of

Schwenckfeld, 3. of the Antinomians, 4. of the Anabaptists, 5. of the

Zwinglians, 6. of the Synergists, 7. of Osiander and Stancarus, 8. of

the Majorists, 9. of the Adiaphorists. Its chief object, as expressly

stated in the Preface, was to warn against the errors introduced by the

Philippists, whose doctrines, as also Planck admits, were not in any

way misrepresented in this document. (4, 597. 595.) The sixth part,

directed against synergism bore the title: "_Confutatio Corruptelarum

in Articulo de Libero Arbitrio sive de Viribus Humanis_--Confutation of

the Corruptions in the Article Concerning Free Will or Concerning the

Human Powers." The _Confutation_ was framed by the Jena theologians,

Strigel and Huegel also participating in its composition. However, some

of the references to the corruptions of the Philippists must have been

rather vague and ambiguous in the first draft of the book; for when it

was revised at the convention in Weimar, Flacius secured the adoption of

additions and changes dealing particularly with the synergism of the

Wittenbergers, which were energetically opposed by Strigel.

Even before the adoption of the _Book of Confutation,_ Strigel had been

polemicizing against Flacius. But now (as Flacius reports) he began to

denounce him at every occasion as the "architect of a new theology" and

an "enemy of the _Augsburg Confession._" At the same time he also

endeavored to incite the students in Jena against him. Flacius, in turn,

charged Strigel with scheming to establish a Philippistic party in Ducal

Saxony. The public breach came when the _Book of Confutation_ was

submitted for adoption and publication in the churches and schools.

Pastor Huegel refused to read and explain it from the pulpit, and

Strigel presented his objections to the Duke, and asked that his

conscience be spared. But when Strigel failed to maintain silence in the

matter, he as well as Pastor Huegel were summarily dealt with by the

Duke. On March 27, 1559, at two o'clock in the morning, both were

suddenly arrested and imprisoned. Flacius who was generally regarded as

the secret instigator of this act of violence, declared publicly that

the arrest had been made without his counsel and knowledge. About six

months later (September 5, 1569) Strigel and Huegel after making some

doctrinal concessions and promising not to enter into any disputation on

the Confutation, were set at liberty. (Planck 4, 591. 604.)

159. Weimar Disputation.

In order to settle the differences, Flacius and his colleagues (Wigand,

Judex, Simon Musaeus), as well as Strigel, asked for a public

disputation, which John Frederick, too was all the more willing to

arrange because dissatisfaction with his drastic procedure against

Strigel and Huegel was openly displayed everywhere outside of Ducal

Saxony. The disputation was held at Weimar, August 2 to 8, 1560. It was

attended by the Saxon Dukes and their entire courts, as well as by a

large number of other spectators, not only from Jena, but also from

Erfurt, Wittenberg and Leipzig. The subjects of discussion, for which

both parties had submitted theses were: Free Will, Gospel, Majorism,

Adiaphorism, and Indifferentism (_academica epoche,_ toleration of

error). The disputing parties (Flacius and Strigel) agreed that "the

only rule should be the Word of God, and that a clear, plain text of the

Holy Scriptures was to weigh more than all the inferences and

authorities of interpreters" (Planck 4, 606.)

According to the proceedings of the Weimar Disputation, written by

Wigand and published by Simon Musaeus 1562 and 1563 under the title:

"_Disputatio de Originali Peccato et Libero Arbitrio_ inter M. Flacium

Illyr. et Vict. Strigelium Publice Vinariae Anno 1560 Habita," the only

questions discussed were free will and, incidentally, original sin.

Strigel defended the Melanchthonian doctrine, according to which the

causes of conversion are the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, and the will

of man feebly assenting to the Gospel and, at the same time, seeking

strength from God. He repeated the formula: "Concurrunt in conversione

haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis,

quae voci divinae assentitur." Flacius, on the other hand, defended the

_mere passive_ of Luther, according to which man, before he is converted

and endowed with faith, does not in any way cooperate with the Holy

Spirit but merely suffers and experiences His operations. At the same

time, however, he seriously damaged and discredited himself as well as

the sacred cause of divine truth by maintaining that original sin is not

a mere accident, such as Strigel maintained, but the very substance of

man. The discussions were discontinued after the thirteenth session. The

Duke announced that the disputation would be reopened later, charging

both parties in the mean time to maintain silence in public,--a

compromise to which Flacius and his adherents were loath to consent.

John Wigand and Matthias Judex however continued to enforce the _Book of

Confutation_ demanding an unqualified adoption in every point, _per

omnia._ When the jurist Matthew Wesenbecius declined to accept the book

in this categorical way, he was not permitted to serve as sponsor at a

baptism. John Frederick was dissatisfied with this procedure and action

of the ministers; and when they persisted in their demands, the

autocratic Duke deprived them of the right to excommunicate, vesting

this power in a consistory established at Weimar. Flacius and his

adherents protested against this measure as tyranny exercised over the

Church and a suppression of the pure doctrine. As a result Musaeus,

Judex, Wigand, and Flacius were suspended and expelled from Jena,

December, 1561. (Gieseler 3, 2, 244. 247.) Their vacant chairs at the

university were filled by Freihub, Salmuth, and Selneccer, who had been

recommended by the Wittenberg Philippists at the request of the Duke,

who now evidently favored a compromise with the Synergists. Strigel,

too, was reinstated at Jena after signing an ambiguous declaration.

Amsdorf, Gallus, Hesshusius, Flacius, and the other exiled theologians

denounced Strigel's declaration as insincere and in conflict with

Luther's book _De Servo Arbitrio,_ and demanded a public retraction of

his synergistic statements. When the ministers of Ducal Saxony also

declined to acknowledge Strigel's orthodoxy, a more definite

"Superdeclaration," framed by Moerlin and Stoessel (but not signed by

Strigel), was added as an interpretation of Strigel's declaration. But

even now a minority refused to submit to the demands of the Duke,

because they felt that they were being deceived by ambiguous terms, such

as "capacity" and "aptitude," which the wily Strigel and the Synergists

used in the active or positive, and not in the passive sense. These

conscientious Lutherans whom the rationalist Planck brands as "almost

insane, _beinahe verrueckt,_" were also deposed and banished, 1562.

Strigel's declaration of March, 1562 however, maintaining that "the will

is passive in so far as God alone works all good, but active in so far

as it must be present in its conversion, must consent, and not resist,

but accept," showed that he had not abandoned his synergism. In the same

year he applied for, and accepted, a professorship in Leipzig. Later on

he occupied a chair at the Reformed university in Heidelberg, where he

died 1569, at the age of only forty-five years.

In 1567, when John William became ruler of Ducal Saxony, the Philippists

were dismissed, and the banished Lutheran pastors and professors (with

the exception of Flacius) were recalled and reinstated. While this

rehabilitation of the loyal Lutherans formally ended the synergistic

controversy in Ducal Saxony, occasional echoes of it still lingered, due

especially to the fact that some ministers had considered Strigel's

ambiguous declaration a satisfactory presentation of the Lutheran truth

with regard to the questions involved. That the synergistic teaching of

Melanchthon was continued in Wittenberg appears, for example, from the

_Confessio Wittenbergica_ of 1570.

160. Strigel's Rationalistic Principle.

Although at the opening of the disputation the debaters had agreed to

decide all questions by clear Scripture-passages alone, Strigel's

guiding principle was in reality not the Bible but philosophy and

reason. His real concern was not, What does Scripture teach concerning

the causes of conversion? but, How may we harmonize the universal grace

of God with the fact that only some are converted and saved?

Self-evidently Strigel, too, quoted Bible-passages. Among others, he

appealed to such texts as John 6, 29; Rom. 1, 16; 10, 17; Luke 8, 18;

Heb. 4, 2; Rev. 3, 20; Luke 11, 13; Mark 9, 24; 1 Thess. 2, 13; Jas. 1,

18. But as we shall show later, his deductions were philosophical and

sophistical rather than exegetical and Scriptural. Preger remarks: In

his disputation Strigel was not able to advance a single decisive

passage of Scripture for the presence and cooperation of a good will at

the moment when it is approached and influenced (_ergriffen_) by grace.

(2, 211.) And the clear, irrefutable Bible-texts on which Flacius

founded his doctrine of the inability of natural will to cooperate in

conversion, Strigel endeavored to invalidate by philosophical reasoning,

indirect arguing, and alleged necessary logical consequences.

At Weimar and in his _Confession_ of December 5 1560, delivered to the

Duke soon after the disputation, Strigel argued: Whoever denies that

man, in a way and measure, is able to cooperate in his own conversion

is logically compelled also to deny that the rejection of grace may be

imputed to man, compelled to make God responsible for man's damnation;

to surrender the universality of God's grace and call; to admit

contradictory wills in God, and to take recourse to an absolute decree

of election and reprobation in order to account for the fact that some

reject the grace of God and are lost while others are converted and

saved. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not say that the will is able

to assent to the Word without the Holy Spirit, but that, being moved and

assisted by the Spirit, it assents with trepidation. If we were unable

to do this, we would not be responsible for not having received the

Word. _Si hoc [utcumque assentiri inter trepidationes] non possemus, non

essemus rei propter Verbum non receptum._" Again, also at Weimar: "If

the will is not able to assent in some way, even when assisted, then we

cannot be responsible for rejecting the Word, but the blame must be

transferred to another, and others may judge how religious that is. _Si

voluntas ne quidem adiuta potest aliquo modo annuere, non possumus esse

rei propter Verbum reiectum, sed culpa est in alium transferenda quod

quam sit religio sum, alii iudicent._" (Planck 4, 689. 719; Luthardt,

_Lehre vom freien Willen,_ 222.)

Over against this rationalistic method of Strigel and the Synergists

generally, the Lutherans adhered to the principle that nothing but a

clear passage of the Bible can decide a theological question. They

rejected as false philosophy and rationalism every argument directed

against the clear sense of a clear Word of God. They emphatically

objected to the employment of reason for establishing a Christian

doctrine or subverting a statement of the Bible. At Weimar, Flacius

protested again and again that human reason is not an authority in

theological matters. "Let us hear the Scriptures! _Audiamus

Scripturam!_" "Let the woman be silent in the Church! _Mulier taceat in

ecclesia!_" With such slogans he brushed aside the alleged necessary

logical inferences and deductions of Strigel. "You take your arguments

from philosophy," he said in the second session, "which ought not to be

given a place in matters of religion. _Disputas ex philosophia, cui

locus in rebus religionis esse non debet._" Again, at Weimar: "It is

against the nature of inquiring truth to insist on arguing from blind

philosophy. What else corrupted such ancient theologians as Clement,

Origen, Chrysostom, and afterwards also the Sophists [scholastic

theologians] but that they endeavored to decide spiritual things by

philosophy, which does not understand the secret and hidden mysteries of

God. _Est contra naturam inquirendae veritatis, si velimus ex caeca

philosophia loqui. Quid aliud corrupit theologos veteres, ut Clementem,

Originem, Chrysosthomum et postea etiam Sophistas, nisi quod de rebus

divinis ex philosophia voluerunt statuere, quae non intelligit

abstrusissima et occultissima mysteria Dei._" "May we therefore observe

the rule of Luther: Let the woman be silent in the Church! For what a

miserable thing would it be if we had to judge ecclesiastical matters

from logic! _Itaque observemus legem Lutheri: Taceat mulier in ecclesia!

Quae enim miseria, si ex dialectica diiudicandae nobis essent res

ecclesiae!_" (Planck 4, 709.)

In an antisynergistic confession published by Schluesselburg, we read:

"This doctrine [of conversion by God's grace alone] is simple, clear,

certain, and irrefutable if one looks to God's Word alone and derives

the _Nosce teipsum,_ Know thyself, from the wisdom of God. But since

poor men are blind, they love their darkness more than the light, as

Christ says John 3, and insist on criticizing and falsifying God's

truth by means of blind philosophy, which, forsooth, is a shame and a

palpable sin, if we but had eyes to see and know.... Whatsoever blind

reason produces in such articles of faith against the Word of God is

false and wrong. For it is said: _Mulier in ecclesia taceat!_ Let

philosophy and human wisdom be silent in the Church." (_Catalogus_ 5,

665f.) Here, too, the sophistical objections of the Synergists are

disposed of with such remarks as: "In the first place, this is but spun

from reason, which thus acts wise in these matters. _Denn fuers erste

ist solches nur aus der Vernunft gesponnen, die weiss also hierin zu

kluegeln._" (668.) "This is all spun from reason; but God's Word teaches

us better. _Dies ist alles aus der Vernunft spintisiert; Gottes Wort

aber lehrt es besser._" (670.)

Evidently Strigel's rationalistic method was identical with that

employed by Melanchthon in his _Loci,_ by Pfeffinger, and the Synergists

generally. Accordingly, his synergism also could not differ essentially

from Melanchthon's. Planck pertinently remarks: "It is apparent from

this [argument of Strigel that natural man must have power to cooperate

in his conversion because otherwise God would be responsible for his

resistance and damnation] that his synergism was none other than that of

the Wittenberg school; for was not this the identical foundation upon

which Melanchthon had reared his [synergism]?" (4, 690.) Like methods

lead to the same results, and _vice versa._ Besides, Strigel had always

appealed to the Wittenbergers; and in his _Opinion on the Weimar

Confutation_ 1559, Melanchthon, in turn, identified himself with

Strigel's arguments. (_C. R._ 9, 766.) The "Confession and Opinion of

the Wittenbergers Concerning Free Will--_Confessio et Sententia

Wittebergensium de Libero Arbitrio_" of 1561 also maintained the same

attitude.

161. Strigel's Theory.

Strigel's views concerning the freedom of man's will in spiritual

matters may be summarized as follows: Man, having a will, is a free

agent, hence always able to decide for or against. This ability is the

"mode of action" essential to man as long as he really is a man and in

possession of a will. Even in matters pertaining to grace this freedom

was not entirely lost in the Fall. It was impeded and weakened by

original sin, but not annihilated. To be converted, man therefore

requires that these residual or remaining powers be excited and

strengthened rather than that new spiritual powers be imparted or a new

will be created. Accordingly, persuasion through the Word is the method

of conversion employed by the Holy Spirit. When the will is approached

by the Word, incited and assisted by the Spirit, it is able to admit the

operations of the Spirit and assent to the Word, though but feebly.

Hence, no matter how much of the work of conversion must be ascribed to

the Holy Spirit and the Word the will itself, in the last analysis,

decides for or against grace. Man is, therefore, not purely passive in

his conversion, but cooperates with the Holy Spirit and the Word, not

merely after, but also in his conversion, before he has received the

gift of faith.

"God who, outside of His essence in external actions, is the freest

agent," said Strigel "created two kinds of natures, the one free, the

other acting naturally (_naturaliter agentes_). The free natures are the

angels and men. Those acting naturally embrace all the rest of the

creatures. A natural agent is one that cannot do anything else [than it

does], nor suspend its action _e.g._, fire. Men and angels were created

differently, after the image of God, that they might be free agents.

_Homines et angeli aliter conditi sunt ad imaginem Dei, ut sint liberum

agens._" (Planck 4, 669.) This freedom, which distinguishes man

essentially from all other creatures, according to Strigel, always

implies the power to will or not to will with respect to any object. He

says: The act of willing, be it good or evil, always belongs to the

will, because the will is so created that it can will or not, without

coercion. "_Ipsum velle, seu bonum seu malum, quod ad substantiam

attinet, semper est voluntatis; quia voluntas sic est condita, UT POSSIT

VELLE AUT NON; sed etiam hoc habet voluntas ex opere creationis quod

adhuc reliquum, et non prorsus abolitum et extinctum est, UT POSSIT

VELLE AUT NON SINE COACTIONE_." (674.) According to Strigel, the very

essence of the will consists in being able, in every instance, to decide

in either direction, for or against. Hence the very idea of will

involves also a certain ability to cooperate in conversion. (689.)

This freedom or ability to decide _pro_ or _con,_ says Strigel, is the

mode of action essential to man, his mode of action also in conversion.

And in the controversy on free will he sought to maintain that this

alleged mode of action was a part of the very essence of the human will

and being. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not wish to detract from

the will the mode of action which is different from other natural

actions. _Nolo voluntati detrahi modum agendi, qui est dissimilis aliis

actionibus naturalibus._" (Planck 4, 668.) Again: "The will is not a

natural, but a free agent; hence the will is converted not as a natural

agent, but as a free agent.... In conversion the will acts in its own

mode; it is not a statue or a log in conversion. Hence conversion does

not occur in a purely passive manner. _Voluntas non est agens naturale,

sed liberum; ergo convertitur voluntas non ut naturaliter agens, sed ut

liberum agens.... Et voluntas suo modo agit in conversione, nec est

statua vel truncus in conversione. Et per consequens non fit conversio

pure passive._" (Luthardt, 217. 219. 209.)

What Strigel means is that man, being a free agent, must, also in

conversion, be accorded the ability somehow to decide for grace.

According to the _Formula of Concord_ the words, "man's mode of action,"

signify "a way of working something good and salutary in divine things."

(905, 61.) The connection and the manner in which the phrase was

employed by Strigel admitted of no other interpretation. Strigel added:

This mode of action marks the difference between the will of man and the

will of Satan, for the devil neither endeavors to assent, nor prays to

God for assistance, while man does. (Luthardt, 220.) Natural man is by

Strigel credited with the power of "endeavoring to assent, _conari

assentiri,_" because he is endowed with a will. But shrewd as Strigel

was, it did not occur to him that, logically, his argument compelled him

to ascribe also to the devils everything he claimed for natural man,

since they, too, have a will and are therefore endowed with the same

_modus agendi,_ which, according to Strigel, belongs to the very idea

and essence of will. Yet this palpable truth, which overthrew his entire

theory, failed to open the eyes of Strigel.

If, as Strigel maintained, the human will, by virtue of its nature as a

free agent, is, in a way, _able_ to cooperate in conversion, then the

only question is how to elevate this ability to an actuality, in other

words, how to influence the will and rouse its powers to move in the

right direction. Strigel answered: Since the will cannot be forced,

moral suasion is the true method required to convert a man. "The will,"

says he "cannot be forced, hence it is by persuasion, _i.e._, by

pointing out something good or evil, that the will is moved to obey and

to submit to the Gospel, not coerced, _but somehow willing. Voluntas non

potest cogi, ergo voluntas persuadendo, id est ostensione alicuius boni

vel mali flectitur ad obediendum et obtemperandum evangelio, non coacta,

sed ALIQUO MODO VOLENS._" (Seeberg 4, 491.) Again: "Although God is

efficacious through the Word, drawing and leading us efficaciously, yet

He does not make assenting necessary for such a nature as the will,--a

nature so created that it is able not to assent, if it so wills, and to

expel Him who dwells in us. This assent therefore is the work of God and

the Holy Spirit, but in so far as it is a free assent, not coerced and

pressed out by force, _it is also the work of the will. Etiam si Deus

est efficax per Verbum et efficaciter nos trahit et ducit, tamen non

affert necessitatem assentiendi tali naturae, qualis est voluntas, id

est, quae sic est condita, ut possit non assentiri, si velit, et

excutere sessorem. Est igitur hic assensus opus Dei et Spiritus Sancti,

sed quatenus est liber assensus, non coactus, expressus vi, EST ETIAM

VOLUNTATIS._" (491.) Strigel evidently means: The fact that man is able

not to assent to grace of necessity involves that somehow (_aliquo

modo_) he is able also to assent, according to man's peculiar mode of

action (freedom) he must himself actualize his conversion by previously

(in the logical order) willing it, deciding for it, and assenting to it;

he would be converted by coercion if his assent to grace were an act of

the will engendered and created solely by God, rather than an act

effected and produced by the powers of the will when incited and

assisted by the Spirit. Man is converted by persuasion only, because God

does not create assent and faith in him but merely elicits these acts

from man by liberating and appealing to the powers of his will to effect

and produce them.

In defending this freedom of the will, Strigel appealed also to the

statement of Luther: "The will cannot be coerced;... if the will could

be coerced, it would not be volition, but rather nolition. _Voluntas non

potest cogi;... si posset cogi voluntas, non esset voluntas sed potius

voluntas._" However, what Luther said of the form or nature of the will,

according to which it always really wills what it wills, and is

therefore never coerced, was by Strigel transferred to the spiritual

matters and objects of the will. According to Strigel's theory, says

Seeberg, "the will must be free even in the first moment of conversion,

free not only in the psychological, but also in the moral sense." (4,

492.) Tschackert, quoting Seeberg remarks that Strigel transformed the

natural formal liberty into an ethical material liberty--_"indem die

natuerliche formale Freiheit sich ihm unter der Hand [?] verwandelte in

die ethische materiale Freiheit._" (524.)

162. Strigel's Semi-Pelagianism.

Strigel's entire position is based on the error that a remnant of

spiritual ability still remains in natural man. True, he taught that in

consequence of original sin the powers of man and the proper use and

exercise of these powers are greatly impeded, weakened, checked, and

insulated, as it were, and that this impediment can be removed solely by

the operation of the Holy Spirit. "Through the Word the Holy Spirit

restores to the will the power and faculty of believing," Strigel

declared. (Luthardt, 250.) But this restoration, he said, was brought

about by liberating, arousing, inciting, and strengthening the powers

inherent in man rather than by divine impartation of new spiritual

powers or by the creation of a new good volition.

Strigel plainly denied that natural man is truly spiritually dead. He

declared: "The will is so created that it can expel the Holy Spirit and

the Word, or, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, can in some manner will

and obey--to receive is the act of the will; in this I cannot concede

that man is simply _dead--accipere est hominis; in hoc non possum

concedere simpliciter mortuum esse hominem._" (Frank 1, 199.) Natural

man, Strigel explained, is indeed not able to grasp the helping hand of

God with his own hand; yet the latter is not dead, but still retains a

minimum of power. (678.) Again: Man is like a new-born child, whose

powers must first be strengthened with nourishment given it by its

mother, and which, _though able to draw this nourishment out of its

mother's breast,_ is yet unable to lift itself up to it, or to take hold

of the breast, unless it be given it. (Preger 2, 209.)

With special reference to the last illustration, Flacius declared:

"Strigel, accordingly, holds that we have the faculty to desire and

receive the food, _i.e._, the benefits of God. Forsooth, you thereby

attribute to corrupt man a very great power with respect to spiritual

things. Now, then, deny that this opinion is Pelagian." (209.) "Your

statements agree with those of Pelagius, yet I do not simply say that

you are a Pelagian; for a good man may fall into an error which he does

not see." Pelagius held that man, by his natural powers, is able to

begin and complete his own conversion; Cassianus, the Semi-Pelagian

taught that man is able merely to begin this work; Strigel maintained

that man can admit the liberating operation of the Holy Spirit, and that

after such operation of the Spirit he is able to cooperate with his

natural powers. Evidently, then, the verdict of Flacius was not much

beside the mark. Planck though unwilling to relegate Strigel to the

Pelagians, does not hesitate to put him down as a thoroughgoing

Synergist. (Planck 4, 683f.) Synergism, however, always includes at

least an element of Pelagianism.

Strigel illustrated his idea by the following analogy. When garlic-juice

is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a

true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its

efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from

beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed

through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will

again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672;

Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: "The example of the

temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this

juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the

related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of

the _Tridentinum_ to this effect: The free will of natural man may be

compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his

locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters." (1, 136.)

Also the _Formula of Concord,_ evidently with a squint at Strigel,

rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching "that original sin is not a

despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these

spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice,

whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this

stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment

from the wall." (865, 22.)

163. Strigel's "Cooperation."

When the impediment caused by original sin has been removed, and the

will liberated and aroused to activity, man, according to Strigel, is

able also to cooperate in his conversion. At Weimar he formulated the

point at issue as follows: "The question is whether [in conversion] the

will is present idle, as an inactive, indolent subject, or, as the

common saying is, in a purely passive way; or whether, when grace

precedes, the will follows the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and in some

manner assents--_an vero praeeunte gratia voluntas comitetur

efficaciam Spiritus Sancti et aliquo modo annuat_." (Luthardt, 222.)

Following are some of his answers to this question: When incited by the

Spirit, the will is able to assent somewhat and to pray for assistance.

_Inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur, simul petens auxilium._

Contrition and faith, as well as other virtues, are gifts of God, "but

they are given to those only who hear and contemplate God's Word,

embrace it by assenting to it, strive against their doubts and in this

conflict pray for the help of God." (230.) The Holy Ghost converts

those "who hear the Word of God and do not resist stubbornly, but

consent," and God assists such only "as follow His call and pray for

assistance." (229.) "The will and heart do not resist altogether, but

desire divine consolation, when, indeed, they are assisted by the Holy

Ghost." "The will is neither idle nor contumacious; but, in a manner,

desires to obey." (Planck 4, 682.) "Man is dead [spiritually] in as far

as he is not able to heal his wounds with his own powers; but when the

remedy is offered him by the Holy Spirit and the Word, then he, at

least in receiving the benefit, is not altogether dead; for otherwise a

conversion could not occur. For I cannot conceive a conversion where

the process is that of the flame consuming straw (_denn ich kann mir

keine Bekehrung vorstellen, bei der es zugeht, wie wenn die Flamme das

Stroh ergreift_). The nature of the will is such that it can reject the

Holy Spirit and the Word; or, being supported by the Holy Spirit, can

in a manner will and obey. The remedy is heavenly and divine, but the

will--not the will alone, but the will supported by the Holy Spirit--is

able to accept it. One must ascribe at least a feeble consent and an

'Aye' to the will, which is already supported by the Holy Spirit."

(Preger 2, 208.) "In a betrothal, consent is necessary; conversion is a

betrothal of Christ to the Church and its individual members; hence

consent is required," which the will is able to give when assisted by

the Holy Spirit. (Luthardt, 224.)

It is, however, only a languid, wavering, and weak consent which man is

able to render (_qualiscumque assensio languida, trepida et imbecilla_).

"Compared with the divine operation," Flacius reports Strigel as having

said, "the cooperation of our powers in conversion is something

extremely small (_quiddam pertenue prorsus_). If, after drinking with a

rich man, he paying a _taler_ and I a _heller,_ I would afterwards boast

that I had been drinking and paying with him--such is cooperation,

_talis est synergia._" (Planck 4, 677; Luthardt, 220. 222.) According to

Strigel, therefore, man is not purely passive, but plays an active part

in his conversion. With Melanchthon and Pfeffinger he maintained: "These

three concur in conversion: the Holy Spirit, who moves the hearts; the

voice of God; the will of man, which assents to the divine voice.

_Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox

Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae assentitur._" (Tschackert,

524.)

Flacius declared with respect to the issue formulated by Strigel: "I

explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely passive (_homo se habet

pure passive_). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its

willing and its powers, then he is purely passive when he receives (_in

accipiendo_). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith

kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this

spark is not purely passive. But the Adamic will does not only not

operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart,

even operates contrarily (_verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui

contra operatur_)." (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished

between cooperation _before_ conversion (which he rejected absolutely)

and cooperation _after_ conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this

point, he said to Strigel: "I ask whether you say that the will

cooperates _before_ the gift of faith or _after_ faith has been received

whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so

far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy

Spirit. _Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut

post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut

quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle._" (Seeberg

4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will

declare it as your opinion "that only the regenerated, sanctified,

renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will."

"Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man

cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by God, not from the

will he brings with him from his natural Adam--_quod homo cooperetur ex

fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo

naturali Adamo.'_" "We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you

[Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end." Strigel, however,

who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to

catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but

repeated that it was only a weak assent (_qualiscumque assensio languida

trepida et imbecilla_) which man was able to render when his will was

incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit.

(Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)

164. Objections Answered.

At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as

one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no

conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in

conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences

conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing

to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely passive in the

reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the

sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge

and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that

good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?"

(216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of

the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not

whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but

whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing

of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of

willing and thinking of God alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that God

alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the

will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the

natural will in conversion (_non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed

excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in

conversione_)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)

In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared:

"Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of God and of

ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will.

_Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit

velle aut perficere nisi nobis volentibus._" Charging Strigel with

ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we

of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these

questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to

see the difference, answered: "For God's sake, have a little forbearance

with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it

be to my discredit.--_Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut

halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's

eine Schand'_." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that

man, too, has a share in _producing_ the good volition, while Flacius

understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the

latter, _e.g._, writing in _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:_ "It is

certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of

whom it is written: It is God who worketh in us to will. _Certum est nos

velle cum volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus

est, qui operatur in nobis velle._" (Frank 1, 238.)

In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely passive in his

conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a

block or stone when he is converted. "That is true," said Flacius, "for

a block can neither love nor hate God, while man by nature hates God,

and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus God is dealing with one

whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial

that man is purely passive in conversion] is buried a popish _meritum de

congruo_ and a particle of free will." (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius

furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate

just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a

statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a

stone or block (_miserior trunco_), because by his natural powers he

resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4,

696f.)

Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he

cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an

impossibility, a contradiction. He said: "If the will, even when

assisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to assent, it must of necessity

resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and

Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and

contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently

rejecting, should be in the same will. _Si voluntas etiam adiuta a

Spiritu Sancto non potest assentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei

repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verbum et Spiritum Sanctum.

Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et

contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem

perstare in reiectione._" Flacius replied: You need but distinguish

between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always

resists, and the new consenting will implanted by God in conversion.

"Man consents with the faith given by God, but he resists with the

inborn wickedness of his Old Adam." Your error is that you acknowledge

only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of

one's own to do and to perform (_talis incitatio includit proprias vires

ad perficiendum_). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is

not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his

faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other

hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (_hominem ...

penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra

insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum_)." "The will is free with respect to

things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In

spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in

order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and

created in, man by the grace of God. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff.,

Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)

Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of

God, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied:

"Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their

actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at

least to observe external decency (_Zucht_), which God earnestly demands

of us, for example, to hear God's Word, to go to church more frequently

than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal

transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he

has not done." "God may justly hold us responsible also with respect to

things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured

powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully

lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)

Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man

is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of God. But the

latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will

of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (_voluntas

repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter_), but not by coercion or

compulsion. Necessity to resist (_necessitas repugnandi_), Flacius

explained, does not involve coercion to resist (_coactio repugnandi_),

since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (_necessitas

immutabilitatis_), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and

yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise

than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve

coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion,

although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of

freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to

remain in union with God is elevated to immutability of so willing.

Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus

too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet

there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man

cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he

is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced

to resist prove that he is able also to assent to grace. The fact, said

Flacius, that the wicked _willingly_ will, think, and do only what

pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite

spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's

tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to

Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills.

In brief: The categories "coercion" and "compulsion" cannot be applied

to the will. This, however, does not imply that God is not able to

create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was

no coercion or compulsion involved when God, creating Adam, Eve, and the

angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as

coercion or compulsion when God, in conversion, bestows faith and a good

will upon man.

In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated

what Luther had written before him, in _De Servo Arbitrio:_ "For if it

is not we, but God alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that

we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But

when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say

by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, _i.e._,

man, destitute of the Spirit of God, does not sin perforce, as though

seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief

or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And

by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or

willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it.

For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else,

within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who

compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to

force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of

immutability, _i.e._, the will cannot change itself and turn to

something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being

resisted, as is proved by its indignation. _Si enim non nos, sed solus

Deus operatur salutem in nobis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare,

velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dicunt,

necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est homo cum vacat

Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS

facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed

sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem

faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed

pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per

vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut

resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim

sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod

voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur

magis ad volendum, dum ei resistitur, quod probat eius indignatio._" (E.

v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)

Flacius was also charged with teaching that "man is converted resisting

(_hominem converti repugnantem_)." In their _Confession and Opinion

Concerning Free Will,_ of 1561, the Wittenberg theologians repeated the

assertion that Flacius taught "_converti hominem ... repugnantem et

hostiliter Deo convertenti adversantem._" (Planck 4, 688.) But Flacius

protested: "I do not simply say that man is converted resisting

(_hominem repugnantem converti_). But I say that he resists with respect

to his natural and carnal free will." "It is not denied that God

converts us as willing and understanding (_quin Deus nos convertat

volentes et intelligentes_), but willing and understanding not from the

Old Adam but from the light given by God and from the good volition

bestowed through the Word and the Holy Spirit." (692.) "Man is converted

or drawn by the Father to the Son not as a thief is cast into prison,

but in such a manner that his evil will is changed into a good will by

the power of the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 218.) It is the very essence

of conversion that by the grace of God unwilling men are made willing.

In support of his error that natural man is able to cooperate in his

conversion Strigel appealed to Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also

helpeth our infirmities," etc.; and appealing to the _Augustana_ for the

correctness of his interpretation, he declared that this passage proves

that one may speak of a languid and weak assent in man even before he is

endowed with faith. Flacius replied that this Bible-passage referred to

such only as are already converted, and that Strigel's interpretation

was found not in the original _Augustana,_ but in the _Variata._--From

the admonition 2 Cor. 5, 20: "Be ye reconciled to God," Strigel inferred

that free will must to a certain extent be capable of accepting the

grace offered by God. Flacius answered that it was a logical fallacy,

conflicting also with the clear Word of God, to conclude that man by his

own powers is able to perform something because God demands it and

admonishes and urges us to do it.--From Acts 5, 32: "...the Holy Ghost,

whom God hath given to them that obey Him," Strigel argued that the will

is able to consent to the Holy Spirit. But Flacius rejoined that this

passage refers to special gifts bestowed upon such as are already

converted.--In support of his synergism, Strigel also appealed to the

Parable of the Prodigal Son, who himself repented and returned to his

father. But Flacius answered: If every detail of this parable taken from

every-day life were to be interpreted in such a manner, Strigel would

have to abandon his own teaching concerning prevenient grace, since

according to the parable the repentance and return of the son precedes

the grace bestowed by the father. (Preger 2, 210f.)

165. Teaching of the Anti-Synergists.

While the Philippists, also in the Synergistic Controversy, endeavored

to supplant the authority and doctrine of Luther by that of Melanchthon,

their opponents, Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others

(though not always fortunate in the choice of their phraseology), stood

four-square on Luther's teaching of the _sola gratia,_ which, they were

fully convinced, was nothing but the pure truth of the Gospel itself.

They maintained that, as a result of the Fall, man has lost his original

holiness and righteousness or the image of God; that both as to his

intellect and will he is totally corrupt spiritually; that of his own

powers he is utterly unable to think or will anything that is truly

good; that not a spark of spiritual life is found in natural man by

virtue of which he might assent to the Gospel or cooperate with the Holy

Spirit in his conversion; that his carnal mind is enmity toward God;

that of his own powers he is active only in resisting the work of the

Holy Spirit, nor is he able to do otherwise; that such resistance

continues until he is converted and a new will and heart have been

created in him; that conversion consists in this, that men who by nature

are unwilling and resist God's grace become such as willingly consent

and obey the Gospel and the Holy Spirit; that this is done solely by

God's grace, through Word and Sacrament; that man is purely passive in

his conversion, inasmuch as he contributes nothing towards it, and

merely suffers and experiences the work of the Holy Spirit; that only

after his conversion man is able to cooperate with the Holy Spirit; that

such cooperation, however, flows not from innate powers of the natural

will, but from the new powers imparted in conversion; that also in the

converted the natural sinful will continues to oppose whatever is truly

good, thus causing a conflict between the flesh and the spirit which

lasts till death; in brief, that man's conversion and salvation are due

to grace alone and in no respect whatever to man and his natural powers.

The _Book of Confutation,_ of 1559, drafted, as stated above, by the

theologians of Jena, designates the synergistic dogma as a "rejection of

grace." Here we also meet with statements such as the following: Human

nature "is altogether turned aside from God, and is hostile toward Him

and subject to the tyranny of sin and Satan (_naturam humanam prorsus a

Deo aversam eique inimicam et tyrannidi peccati ac Satanae subiectam

esse_)." It is impossible for the unregenerate man "to understand or to

apprehend the will of God revealed in the Word, or by his own power to

convert himself to God and to will or perform anything good (_homini non

renato impossibile esse intelligere aut apprehendere voluntatem Dei in

Verbo patefactam aut sua ipsius voluntate ad Deum se convertere, boni

aliquid velle aut perficere_)." "Our will to obey God or to choose the

good is utterly extinguished and corrupted. _Voluntas nostra ad Dei

obedientiam aut ad bonum eligendum prorsus extincta et depravata est_."

(Tschackert, 523; Gieseler 3, 2, 229.)

The second of the Propositions prepared by Simon Musaeus and Flacius for

the Disputation at Weimar, 1560, reads: "Corrupt man cannot operate or

cooperate toward anything good by true motions, and such as proceed from

the heart; for his heart is altogether dead spiritually, and has utterly

lost the image of God, or all powers and inclinations toward that which

is good. _Homo corruptus nihil boni potest veris ac ex corde

proficiscentibus motibus operari aut cooperari, nom plane est

spiritualiter mortuus et Dei imaginem seu omnes bonas vires et

inclinationes prorsus amisit._" The third: Not only "has he lost

entirely all good powers, but, in addition, he has also acquired

contrary and most evil powers, ... so that, of necessity or inevitably,

he constantly and vehemently opposes God and true piety (_ita [tr. note:

sic on punctuation] ut necessario seu inevitabiliter Deo ac verae

pietati semper et vehementer adversetur._" The fourth thesis states that

God alone, through His Word and the Holy Spirit, converts, draws, and

illumines man, kindles faith, justifies, renews, and creates him unto

good works, while natural or Adamic free will is of itself not only

inactive, but resists (_non solum non cooperante ex se naturali aut

Adamico libero arbitrio, sed etiam contra furente ac fremente_). (Planck

4, 692; Gieseler 3, 2, 245.)

The same position was occupied by the Mansfeld ministers in a statement

of August 20, 1562, and by Hesshusius in his _Confutation of the

Arguments by which the Synergists Endeavor to Defend Their Error

Concerning the Powers of the Dead Free Will_. They held that in his

conversion man is purely passive and has no mode of action whatever;

that he is but the passive subject who is to be converted (_subiectam

patiens, subiectum convertendum_); that he contributes no more to his

conversion than an infant to its own formation in the womb of its

mother; that he is passive, like a block, inasmuch as he does not in any

way cooperate, but at the same time differs from, and is worse than, a

block, because he is active in resisting the Holy Spirit until he has

been converted. The _Confession_ presented by the theologians of Ducal

Saxony (Wigand, Coelestinus, Irenaeus, Rosinus, Kirchner, etc.) at the

Altenburg Colloquy March, 1569, occupies the same doctrinal position. As

stated before, these theologians made it a special point also to declare

their agreement with Luther's book _De Servo Arbitrio_. (Schluesselburg

5, 316. 133.)

166. Attitude of Formula of Concord.

The second article of the _Formula of Concord_, which decided the

questions involved in the Synergistic Controversy, takes a clear,

determined, and consistent stand against all forms and formulas of

synergism. At the same time it avoids all extravagant, improper,

offensive, and inadequate terms and phrases, as well as the numerous

pitfalls lurking everywhere in the questions concerning free will,

against which also some of the opponents of the Synergists had not

always sufficiently been on their guard. Article II teaches "that

original sin is an unspeakable evil and such an entire corruption of

human nature that in it and all its internal and external powers nothing

pure or good remains, but everything is entirely corrupt, so that on

account of original sin man is in God's sight truly spiritually dead,

with all his powers dead to that which is good (_dass der Mensch durch

die Erbsuende wahrhaftig vor Gott geistlich tot und zum Guten mit allen

seinen Kraeften erstorben sei_)" (CONC. TRIGL. 879, 60); "that in

spiritual and divine things the intellect, heart, and will of the

unregenerate man are utterly unable, by their own natural powers, to

understand, believe, accept, think, will, begin, effect, work, or concur

in working, anything, but they are entirely dead to what is good, and

corrupt, so that in man's nature since the Fall, before regeneration,

there is not the least spark of spiritual power remaining, nor present,

by which, of himself, he can prepare himself for God's grace, or accept

the offered grace, nor be capable of it for and of himself, or apply or

accommodate himself thereto, or by his own powers be able of himself, as

of himself, to aid, do, work, or concur in working anything towards his

conversion either wholly, or half, or in any, even the least or most

inconsiderable part; but that he is the servant [and slave] of sin, John

8, 34, and a captive of the devil, by whom he is moved, Eph. 2, 2;

2 Tim. 2, 26. Hence natural free will according to its perverted

disposition and nature is strong and active only with respect to what is

displeasing and contrary to God" (883, 7; 887, 17); that "before man is

enlightened, converted, regenerated, renewed and drawn by the Holy

Spirit he can of himself and of his own natural powers begin work, or

concur in working in spiritual things and in his own conversion or

regeneration just as little as a stone or a block or clay." (891, 24);

that, moreover, "in this respect" [inasmuch as man resists the Holy

Spirit] "it may well be said that man is not a stone or block, for a

stone or block does not resist the person who moves it, nor does it

understand and is sensible of what is being done with it, as man with

his will so long resists God the Lord until he is converted (_donec ad

Deum conversus fuerit_)" (905, 59); that "the Holy Scriptures ascribe

conversion, faith in Christ, regeneration, renewal, and all that belongs

to their efficacious beginning and completion, not to the human powers

of the natural free will, neither entirely, nor half nor in any, even

the least or most inconsiderable part, but _in solidum_, that is,

entirely and solely, to the divine working and the Holy Spirit" (891,

25); that "the preaching and hearing of God's Word are instruments of

the Holy Ghost, by, with, and through which He desires to work

efficaciously, and to convert men to God, and to work in them both to

will and to do" (901, 52); that "as soon as the Holy Ghost ... has begun

in us this His work of regeneration and renewal, it is certain that

through the power of the Holy Ghost we can and should cooperate

(_mitwirken_), although still in great weakness" (907, 65); that this

cooperation, however, "does not occur from our carnal natural powers,

but from the new powers and gifts which the Holy Ghost has begun in us

in conversion," and "is to be understood in no other way than that the

converted man does good to such an extent and so long as God by His Holy

Spirit rules, guides, and leads him, and that as soon as God would

withdraw His gracious hand from him, he could not for a moment persevere

in obedience to God," and that hence it is not a power independent from,

and coordinated with, the Holy Spirit, as though "the converted man

cooperated with the Holy Ghost in the manner as when two horses together

draw a wagon" (907, 66); and finally, that as to the

three-concurring-causes doctrine it is "manifest, from the explanations

presented that conversion to God is a work of God the Holy Ghost alone,

who is the true Master that alone works this in us, for which He uses

the preaching and hearing of His holy Word as His ordinary means and

instrument. But the intellect and will of the unregenerate man are

nothing else than _subiectum convertendum_, that is, that which is to be

converted, it being the intellect and will of a spiritually dead man, in

whom the Holy Ghost works conversion and renewal, towards which work

man's will that is to be converted does nothing, but suffers God alone

to work in him until he is regenerated and then he [cooperates] works

also with the Holy Ghost that which is pleasing to God in other good

works that follow in the way and to the extent fully set forth above"

(915, 90).

It has been said that originally also the _Formula of Concord_ in its

Torgau draft (_Das Torgausche Buch, i.e._, the draft preceding the

Bergic Book=_Formula of Concord_) contained the three-concurring-causes

doctrine of Melanchthon and the Synergists. As a matter of fact,

however, the Torgau Book does not speak of three causes of conversion,

but of three causes in those who are already converted,--a doctrine

entirely in agreement with the _Formula of Concord_, which, as shown,

plainly teaches that after conversion the will of man also cooperates

with the Holy Spirit. In the Torgau Book the passage in question reads:

"Thus also three causes concur to effect this internal new obedience in

the converted. The first and chief cause is God Father, Son, and Holy

Ghost.... The second is God's Word.... The third is man's intellect,

enlightened by the Holy Spirit, which ponders and understands God's

command [threat and promise], and our new and regenerate will, which is

governed by the Holy Spirit, and now desires with a glad and willing

heart (_herzlich gern und willig_), though in great weakness, to submit

to, and obey, the Word and will of God." In the same sense, at the

colloquy in AItenburg, 1568 to 1569, the Jena theologians also mentioned

as a "third cause" "the mind of man, which is regenerated and renewed,

and yields to, and obeys, the Holy Spirit and the Word of God (_des

Menschen Gemuet, so wiedergeboren und erneuert ist und dem Heiligen

Geiste und Gottes Wort Folge tut und gehorsam ist_)." (Frank 1, 214f.)