Wednesday, May 16, 2012

F. Bente - Historical Introductions.
The Father of Synergism


154. The Father of Synergism.

During the first period of his activity in Wittenberg, Melanchthon was
in perfect agreement with Luther also on the question of man's inability
in spiritual matters and the sole activity, or monergism, of grace in
the work of his salvation. As late as 1530 he incorporated these views
in the _Augsburg Confession,_ as appears, in particular, from Articles
II, V, XVIII, and XIX. His later doctrine concerning the three
concurring causes of conversion (the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the
consenting will of man), as well as his theory explaining
synergistically, from an alleged dissimilar action in man, the
difference why some are saved while others are lost, is not so much as
hinted at in the Confession. But even at this early date (1530) or soon
after, Melanchthon also does not seem any longer to have agreed
whole-heartedly with Luther in the doctrine of grace and free will. And
in the course of time his theology drifted farther and farther from its
original monergistic moorings. Nor was Luther wholly unaware of the
secret trend of his colleague and friend toward--Erasmus. In 1536, when
the deviations of Melanchthon and Cruciger, dealt with in our previous
chapter, were brought to his notice, Luther exclaimed: "_Haec est
ipsissima theologia Erasmi._ This is the identical theology of Erasmus,
nor can there be anything more opposed to our doctrine." (Kolde,
_Analecta,_ 266.)

That Melanchthon's theology was verging toward Erasmus appears from his
letter of June 22, 1537, to Veit Dietrich, in which he said that he
desired a more thorough exposition also of the doctrines of
predestination and of the _consent of the will._ (_C. R._ 3, 383.)
Before this, in his _Commentary on Romans_ of 1532, he had written that
there is some cause of election also in man; _viz._, in as far as he
does not repudiate the grace offered--"_tamen eatenus aliquam causam in
accipiente esse quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat_." (Seeberg 4,
442.) In an addition to his _Loci_ of 1533 he also spoke of a cause of
justification and election residing in man. (_C. R._ 21, 332.) In the
revised editions of 1535 and 1543 he plainly began to prepare the way
for his later bold and unmistakable deviations. For even though unable
to point out a clean-cut and unequivocal synergistic statement, one
cannot read these editions without scenting a Semi-Pelagian and Erasmian
atmosphere. What Melanchthon began to teach was the doctrine that man,
when approached by the Word of God, is able to assume either an attitude
of _pro_ or _con_, _i.e._, for or against the grace of God. The same
applies to the _Variata_ of 1540 in which the frequent "_adiuvari_"
there employed, though not incorrect as such, was not without a
synergistic flavor.

Tschackert remarks of the _Loci_ of 1535: "Melanchthon wants to make man
responsible for his state of grace. Nor does the human will in
consequence of original sin lose the ability to decide itself when
incited; the will produces nothing new by its own power, but assumes an
attitude toward what approaches it. When man hears the Word of God, and
the Holy Spirit produces spiritual affections in his heart, the will can
either assent or turn against it. In this way Melanchthon arrives at the
formula, ever after stereotype with him, that there are three concurring
causes in the process of conversion: 'the Word of God, the Holy Spirit,
and the human will, which, indeed, is not idle, _but strives against its
infirmity.'_" (520.)

However, during the life of Luther, Melanchthon made no further
measurable progress towards synergism. Perhaps the unpleasant
experiences following upon his innovations in the doctrine of good works
acted as a check also on the public development of his synergistic
tendencies. During Luther's life Melanchthon, as he himself admitted to
Carlowitz (106), dissimulated, keeping his deviating views to himself
and his intimate friends. After Luther's death, however, he came out
unmistakably and publicly, also in favor of synergism, endorsing even
the Erasmian definition of free will as "the power in man to apply
himself to grace." He plainly taught that, when drawn by the Holy
Spirit, the will is able to decide _pro_ or _con,_ to obey or to resist.
Especially in his lectures, Melanchthon--not indeed directly, but
mentioning the name of Flacius--continually lashed such phrases of
Luther as "purely passive," "block," "resistance,"--a fact to which
Schluesselburg, who had studied in Wittenberg, refers in support of his
assertion that Melanchthon had departed from Luther's teaching on free
will. (_Catalogus_ 5, 32.) While Melanchthon formerly (in his _Loci_ of
1543) had spoken of three causes of a good action (_bonae actionis_) he
now publicly advocated the doctrine of three concurring causes of
_conversion._ Now he boldly maintained that, since the grace of God is
universal, one must assume, and also teach, that there are different
actions in different men, which accounts for the fact that some are
converted and saved while others are lost. According to the later
Melanchthon, therefore, man's eternal salvation evidently does not
depend on the gracious operations of God's Holy Spirit and Word alone,
but also on his own correct conduct toward grace. In his heart,
especially when approaching the mercy-seat in prayer, Melanchthon, no
doubt, forgot and disavowed his own teaching, and believed and practised
Luther's _sola-gratia_-doctrine. But it cannot be denied that, in his
endeavors to harmonize universal grace with the fact that not all, but
some only, are saved, Melanchthon repudiated the monergism of Luther,
espoused and defended the powers of free will in spiritual matters, and
thought, argued, spoke, and wrote in terms of synergism. Indeed,
Melanchthon must be regarded as the father of both synergism and the
rationalistic methods employed in its defense, and as the true father
also of the modern rationalistico-synergistic theology represented by
such distinguished men as Von Hofmann, Thomasius, Kahnis, Luthardt, etc.
(Pieper 2, 582; Frank 1, 231.)

155. Unsound Statements of Melanchthon.

Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of
Melanchthon: In the _Loci_ of 1535 the so-called human cause of
conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as
endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do
not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the
endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary,
since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the
Word of God, but strive to obey it.... We see that these causes are
united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not
idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical
writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: 'Only will, and
God will precede,' God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but let us
beware lest we resist.... Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who
is willing." (_C. R._ 21, 376.)

In conversion and salvation God certainly must do and does His share,
but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is
also the impression received from Melanchthon's statements in the third
elaboration of his _Loci,_ 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good
action concur (_hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis_): the Word
of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will assenting to and not
resisting the Word of God (_humana voluntas assentiens, nec repugnans
Verbo Dei_). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of
his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does
not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit
assisting, endeavors to assent,--in such a struggle the will is not
inactive (_in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa_). The ancients have
said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows.
So also Basil says: '_Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta_, Only will,
and God anticipates. God precedes, calls, moves, assists us; but as for
us, let us see to it that we do not resist. _Deus antevertit nos, vocat,
movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,_' (21, 658.) And Phil.
1, 6: 'He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the
day of Jesus Christ,' _i.e._, we are assisted by God (_adiuvamur a
Deo_), but we must hear the Word of God and not resist the drawing God."
(916.) "God draws our minds that they will, but we must assent, not
resist. _Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed assentiri nos, non repugnare
oportet._" (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when
assisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. _Fit autem voluntas
adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera._" (663.) Frank comments
pertinently that the _magis_ presupposes a certain degree of liberty of
the will before the assistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)

The boldest synergistic statements are found in the _Loci_ of 1548. It
was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was
embodied as follows: "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a
block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (_C.
R._ 7, 51. 260.) As to the _Loci_ of this year, Bindseil remarks in the
_Corpus Reformatorum:_ "This edition is famous on account of certain
paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these
additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the
faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon
was charged with synergism by the Flacians.... For this reason the
edition is called by J. T. Mayer 'the worst of all (_omnium pessima_).'"
At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify
himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (_facultas
applicandi se ad gratiam_) as found in one of these sections. When
Flacius quoted the passage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not
defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition
[1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend
it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked:
"The _Loci Communes_ of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the
_locus de libero arbitrio_ must confess, even if he judges most mildly,
that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four
paragraphs which were inserted after Luther's death? For here we read:
'There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is
rejected, a David received.'" (Pieper 2, 587.)

From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in
David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free
will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the
promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does
something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken
away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word,
he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (_C. R._ 21, 659.) Again: "I
therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that
free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and
immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you
hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is
that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented
to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can
(_immo aliquo modo potes_), and when you sustain yourself with the voice
of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the
Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this
manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle
with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious
affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that
free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (_liberum
arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam_); _i.e._,
he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against
conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore
between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These
matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered.
For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory
wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference
why Saul is rejected and David is received; _i.e._, there must of
necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. _Cum promissio sit
universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in
nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David
recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his
duobus._ Properly understood, this is true, and the use [_usus_] in the
exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in
the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of
causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (_C. R._ 21,
659f.)

At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is
reported to have said that the passage in his _Loci_ of 1548 defining
free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the
regenerated will (_voluntas renata_), as, he said, appeared from the
context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact,
however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the
passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in
conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly
confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying
that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving
against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from
that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply
itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar
actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability
accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such
was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but
which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new
edition of his _Loci._ For all, including the last one to appear during
his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by
the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all
subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (_C. R._ 21, 570.)

The sections which were added to the _Loci_ after 1548 also breathe the
same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which
says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or
resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in
the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to
govern his motions, _i.e._, he can enjoin upon his external members such
actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he
cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart
without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when
the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. _Cum autem
trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare._" (21, 1078; 13,
162.)

Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his _Loci_ of
1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (_bonae
actionis_), Melanchthon, in his _Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni_ of 1550,
substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these
causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will
of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with
trepidation, assents. _Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus
Sanctus ... vox Evangelii ... et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat
voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur_." Again: "And
concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the
assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but
he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and
there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in
a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of
the will (_tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio_)." "God therefore
begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is
willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from
the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God
always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (_auxilium Dei semper
initio et deinceps concurrere_)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely
concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the
third. In his _Examen Ordinandorum_ of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced
the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these
causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son
send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the
Word of God (_et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo
Dei_). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both
preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the
promise of grace.... Let us therefore not resist but assent to the
promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come
to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his _Opinion on the
Weimar Book of Confutation,_ March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again,
if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred
that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the
consolation. _Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist
dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen
Geist, so er den Trost annimmt._" (9, 768.)

W. Preger is right when he says: "According to Melanchthon's view,
natural man is able to do the following [when the Word of God is
preached to him]: he is able not to resist; he is able to take pains
with respect to obedience; he is able to comfort himself with the
Word.... This [according to Melanchthon] is a germ of the positive good
will still found in natural man which prevenient grace arouses."
(_Flacius Illyricus_ 2, 189 f.) Schmauk writes: Melanchthon found "the
cause for the actual variation in the working of God's grace in man, its
object. This subtle synergistic spirit attacks the very foundation of
Lutheranism, flows out into almost every doctrine, and weakens the
Church at every point. And it was particularly this weakness which the
great multitude of Melanchthon's scholars, who became the leaders of the
generation of which we are speaking, absorbed, and which rendered it
difficult to return, finally, after years of struggle, to the solid
ground, once more recovered in the _Formula of Concord._" (_Conf.
Principle,_ 601.)

R. Seeberg characterizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "A
synergistic trait therefore appears in his doctrine. In the last
analysis, God merely grants the outer and inner possibility of obtaining
salvation. Without man's cooperation this possibility would not become
reality; and he is able to refuse this cooperation. It is, therefore, in
conversion equally a cause with the others. _Sie [die Mitwirkung des
Menschen] ist also freilich eine den andern Ursachen gleichberechtigte
Ursache in der Bekehrung._" God makes conversion possible, but only the
decision of man's free will makes it actual,--such, according to
Seeberg, was the "synergism" of Melanchthon. (Seeberg, _Dogg.,_ 4, 444.
446.)

Frank says of Melanchthon's way of solving the question why some are
converted and saved while others are lost: "The road chosen by
Melanchthon has indeed led to the goal. The contradictions are solved.
But let us look where we have landed. We are standing--in the Roman
camp!" After quoting a passage from the _Tridentinum,_ which speaks of
conversion in terms similar to those employed by Melanchthon, Frank
continues: "The foundation stone of Luther's original Reformation
doctrine of salvation by grace alone; _viz._, that nothing in us, not
even our will moved and assisted by God, is the _causa meritoria_ of
salvation, is subverted by these propositions; and it is immaterial to
the contrite heart whether much or little is demanded from free will as
the faculty of applying oneself to grace." Frank adds: "What the
Philippists, synchronously [with Melanchthon] and later, propounded
regarding this matter [of free will] are but variations of the theme
struck by Melanchthon. Everywhere the sequence of thought is the same,
with but this difference, that here the faults of the Melanchthonian
theory together with its consequences come out more clearly." (1, 134f.)
The same is true of modern synergistic theories. Without exception they
are but variations of notes struck by Melanchthon,--the father of all
the synergists that have raised their heads within the Lutheran Church.

156. Pfeffinger Champions Synergistic Doctrine.

Prior to 1556 references to the unsound position of the Wittenberg and
Leipzig theologians are met with but occasionally. (Planck 4, 568.) The
unmistakably synergistic doctrine embodied in the _Loci_ of 1548, as
well as in the Leipzig Interim, did not cause alarm and attract
attention immediately. But when, in 1555, John Pfeffinger [born 1493;
1539 superintendent, and 1543 professor in Leipzig; assisted 1548 in
framing the Leipzig Interim; died January 1, 1573] published his "Five
Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will--_De Libertate
Voluntatis Humanae Quaestiones Quinque._ D. Johannes Pfeffinger Lipsiae
Editae in Officina Georgii Hantschi 1555," the controversy flared up
instantly. It was a little booklet containing besides a brief
introduction, only 41 paragraphs, or theses. In these Pfeffinger
discussed and defended the synergistic doctrine of Melanchthon,
maintaining that in conversion man, too, must contribute his share
though it be ever so little.

Early in the next year Pfeffinger was already opposed by the theologians
of Thuringia, the stanch opponents of the Philippists, John Stolz,
court-preacher at Weimar composing 110 theses for this purpose. In 1558
Amsdorf published his _Public Confession of the True Doctrine of the
Gospel and Confutation of the Fanatics of the Present Time,_ in which
he, quoting from memory, charged Pfeffinger with teaching that man is
able to prepare himself for grace by the natural powers of his free
will, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and their
disciples, had held. (Planck 4, 573. 568.) About the same time Stolz
published the 110 theses just referred to with a preface by Aurifaber
(_Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio_). Flacius,
then professor in Jena, added his _Refutation of Pfeffinger's
Propositions on Free Will_ and _Jena Disputation on Free Will._ In the
same year, 1558, Pfeffinger, in turn published his _Answer to the Public
Confession of Amsdorf,_ charging the latter with falsification, and
denouncing Flacius as the "originator and father of all the lies which
have troubled the Lutheran Church during the last ten years." But at the
same time Pfeffinger showed unmistakably that the charges of his
opponents were but too well founded. Says Planck: "Whatever may have
moved Pfeffinger to do so, he could not (even if Flacius himself had
said it for him) have confessed synergism more clearly and more
definitely than he did spontaneously and unasked in this treatise." (4,
574.) Frank: "Pfeffinger goes beyond Melanchthon and Strigel; for the
action here demanded of, and ascribed to, the natural will is, according
to him, not even in need of liberation by prevenient grace.... His
doctrine may without more ado be designated as Semi-Pelagianism." (1,
137.)

At Wittenberg, Pfeffinger was supported by George Major, Paul Eber, and
Paul Crell and before long his cause was espoused also by Victorin
Strigel in Jena. Disputations by the Wittenberg and Leipzig synergists
(whom Schluesselburg, 5, 16, calls "cooperators" and "die freiwilligen
Herren") and by their opponents in Jena increased the animosity. Both
parties cast moderation to the winds. In a public letter of 1558 the
Wittenberg professors, for example, maligned Flacius in every possible
way, and branded him as "der verloffene undeutsche Flacius Illyricus"
and as the sole author of all the dissensions in the churches of
Germany. (Planck 4, 583.)

157. Statements of Pfeffinger.

Following are some of the synergistic deliverances made by Pfeffinger in
his _Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will._ Par. 11
reads: "Thirdly, when we inquire concerning the spiritual actions, it is
correct to answer that the human will has not such a liberty as to be
able to effect the spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit
(_humanam voluntatem non habere eiusmodi libertatem, ut motus
spirituales sine auxilio Spiritus Sancti efficere possit_)." Par. 14:
"Therefore some assent or apprehension on our part must concur (_oportet
igitur nostram aliquam assensionem seu apprehensionem concurrere_) when
the Holy Spirit has aroused (_accenderit_) the mind, the will and the
heart. Hence Basil says: Only will, and God anticipates; and Chrysostom:
He who draws, draws him who is willing; and Augustine: He assists those
who have received the gift of the call with becoming piety, and preserve
the gifts of God as far as man is able. Again: When grace precedes, the
will follows--_praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate._" In Par. 16 we
read: "The will, therefore, is not idle, but assents faintly. _Voluntas
igitur non est otiosa sed languide assentitur._"

Paragraph 17 runs: "If the will were idle or purely passive, there would
be no difference between the pious and the wicked, or between the elect
and the damned, as, between Saul and David, between Judas and Peter. God
would also become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in
the wicked and damned; and to God would be ascribed contradictory wills,
--which conflicts with the entire Scripture. Hence it follows that there
is in us a cause why some assent while others do not. _Sequitur ergo in
nobis esse aliquam causam, cur alii assentiantur, alii non
assentiantur_." Par. 24: "Him [the Holy Spirit], therefore, we must not
resist; but on the part of our will, which is certainly not like a stone
or block, some assent must be added--_sed aliquam etiam assensionem
accedere nostrae voluntatis, quam non sicut saxum aut incudem se habere
certum est._" Par. 30: "But apprehension on our part must concur. For,
since the promise of grace is universal, and since we must obey this
promise, some difference between the elect and the rejected must be
inferred from our will (_sequitur, aliquod discrimen inter electos et
reiectos a voluntate nostra sumendum esse_), _viz._, that those who
resist the promise are rejected, while those who embrace the promise are
received.... All this clearly shows that our will is not idle in
conversion or like a stone or block in its conduct. _Ex quibus omnibus
manifestissimum apparet, voluntatem nostram non esse otiosam in
conversione, aut se ut saxum aut incudem habere._"

Par. 34 reads: "Some persons, however, shout that the assistance of the
Holy Spirit is extenuated and diminished if even the least particle be
attributed to the human will. Though this argument may appear specious
and plausible, yet pious minds understand that by our doctrine--
according to which we ascribe some cooperation to our will; _viz._, some
assent and apprehension (_qua tribuimus aliquam SYNERGIAM voluntati
nostrae, videlicet qualemcumque assensionem et apprehensionem_)--
absolutely nothing is taken away from the assistance rendered by the
Holy Spirit. For we affirm that the first acts (_primas partes_) must be
assigned and attributed to Him who first and primarily, through the Word
or the voice of the Gospel, moves our hearts to believe, to which
thereupon we, too, ought to assent as much as we are able (_cui deinde
et NOS, QUANTUM IN NOBIS EST, ASSENTIRI oportet_), and not resist the
Holy Spirit, but submit to the Word, ponder, learn, and hear it, as
Christ says: 'Whosoever hath heard of the Father and learned, cometh to
Me.'" Par. 36: "And although original sin has brought upon our nature a
ruin so sad and horrible that we can hardly imagine it, yet we must not
think that absolutely all the knowledge (_notitiae_) which was found in
the minds of our first parents before the Fall has on that account been
destroyed and extinguished after the Fall, or that the human will does
not in any way differ from a stone or a block; for we are, as St. Paul
has said most seriously, coworkers with God, which coworking, indeed, is
assisted and strengthened by the Holy Spirit--_sumus synergi Dei, quae
quidem synergia adiuvatur a Spiritu Sancto et confirmatur._" Evidently
no comment is necessary to show that the passages cited from Pfeffinger
are conceived, born, and bred in Semi-Pelagianism and rationalism.

Planck furthermore quotes from Pfeffinger's _Answer to Amsdorf,_ 1558:
"And there is no other reason why some are saved and some are damned
than this one alone, that some, when incited by the Holy Spirit, do not
resist, but obey Him and accept the grace and salvation offered, while
others will not accept it, but resist the Holy Spirit, and despise the
grace." (4, 578.) Again: "Although the will cannot awaken or incite
itself to spiritually good works, but must be awakened and incited
thereto by the Holy Ghost, yet man is not altogether excluded from such
works of the Holy Ghost, as if he were not engaged in it and were not to
contribute his share to it--_dass er nicht auch dabei sein und das Seine
nicht auch dabei tun muesse._" (576.) Again: In the hands of the Holy
Spirit man is not like a block or stone in the hands of a sculptor,
which do not and cannot "know, understand, or feel what is done with
them, nor in the least further or hinder what the artist endeavors to
make of them." (576.) "But when the heart of man is touched, awakened,
and moved by the Holy Ghost, man must not be like a dead stone or block,
... but must obey and follow Him. And although he perceives his great
weakness, and, on the other hand, how powerfully sin in his flesh
opposes, he must nevertheless not desist, but ask and pray God for grace
and assistance against sin and flesh." (577.) Planck remarks: According
to Pfeffinger, the powers for all this are still found in natural man,
and the only thing required is, not to recreate them, but merely to
incite them to action. (579.)

In 1558, in an appendix to his disputation of 1555, Pfeffinger explained
and illustrated his position, in substance, as follows: I was to prove
nothing else than that some use of the will [in spiritual matters] was
left, and that our nature is not annihilated or extinguished, but
corrupted and marvelously depraved after the Fall. Now, to be sure, free
will cannot by its own natural powers regain its integrity nor rise
after being ruined, yet as the doctrine [the Gospel] can be understood
by paying attention to it, so it can also in a manner (_aliquo modo_) be
obeyed by assenting to it. But it is necessary for all who would dwell
in the splendor of the eternal light and in the sight of God to look up
to and not turn away from, the light. Schluesselburg adds: "_Haec certe
est synergia_--This is certainly synergism." (_Catalogus_ 5, 161.)

Tschackert summarizes Pfeffinger's doctrine as follows: "When the Holy
Spirit, through the Word of God, influences a man, then the assenting
will becomes operative as a factor of conversion. The reason why some
assent while others do not must be in themselves.... Evidently
Pfeffinger's opinion was that not only the regenerate, but even the
natural will of man possesses the ability either to obey the divine
Spirit or to resist Him." (521.) According to W. Preger, Pfeffinger
taught "that the Holy Spirit must awaken and incite our nature that it
may understand, think, will and do what is right and pleasing to God,"
but that natural free will is able "to obey and follow" the motions of
the Spirit. (2, 192. 195.)

No doubt, Pfeffinger advocated, and was a candid exponent and champion
of, nothing but the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon,
according to which God never fails to do His share in conversion, while
we must beware (_sed nos viderimus, C. R._ 21, 658) lest we fail to do
our share. Pfeffinger himself made it a special point to cite
Melanchthon as his authority in this matter. The last (41st) paragraph
in his _Five Questions_ begins as follows: "We have briefly set forth
the doctrine concerning the liberty of the human will, agreeing with the
testimonies of the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures, a fuller
explanation of which students may find in the writings of our preceptor,
Mr. Philip (_prolisciorem explicationem requirant studiosi in scriptis
D. Philippi, praeceptoris nostri_)." And when, in the subsequent
controversy Pfeffinger was publicly assailed by Amsdorf, Flacius, and
others, everybody knew that their real target was none other than--
Master Philip. Melanchthon, too, was well aware of this fact. In his
_Opinion on the Weimar Confutation,_ of March 9, 1559, in which the
synergism of the Philippists is extensively treated, he said: "As to
free will, it is apparent that they attack me, Philip, in particular."
(_C. R._ 9, 763.)

158. Strigel and Huegel Entering Controversy.

The synergistic controversy received new zest and a new impetus when, in
1559, Victorin Strigel and Huegel (Hugelius), respectively professor and
pastor at Jena, the stronghold of the opponents of the Wittenberg
Philippists, opposed Flacius, espoused the cause of Pfeffinger,
championed the doctrine of Melanchthon, and refused to endorse the so
called _Book of Confutation_ which Flacius had caused to be drafted
particularly against the Wittenberg Philippists and Synergists, and to
be introduced. The situation thus created was all the more sensational
because, in the preceding controversies, Strigel had, at least
apparently, always sided with the opponents of the Philippists.

The "_Konfutationsbuch_--Book of Confutation and Condemnations of the
Chief Corruptions, Sects, and Errors Breaking in and Spreading at this
Time" was published in 1559 by Duke John Frederick II as a doctrinal
norm of his duchy. In nine chapters this Book, a sort of forerunner of
the _Formula of Concord,_ dealt with the errors 1. of Servetus, 2. of
Schwenckfeld, 3. of the Antinomians, 4. of the Anabaptists, 5. of the
Zwinglians, 6. of the Synergists, 7. of Osiander and Stancarus, 8. of
the Majorists, 9. of the Adiaphorists. Its chief object, as expressly
stated in the Preface, was to warn against the errors introduced by the
Philippists, whose doctrines, as also Planck admits, were not in any
way misrepresented in this document. (4, 597. 595.) The sixth part,
directed against synergism bore the title: "_Confutatio Corruptelarum
in Articulo de Libero Arbitrio sive de Viribus Humanis_--Confutation of
the Corruptions in the Article Concerning Free Will or Concerning the
Human Powers." The _Confutation_ was framed by the Jena theologians,
Strigel and Huegel also participating in its composition. However, some
of the references to the corruptions of the Philippists must have been
rather vague and ambiguous in the first draft of the book; for when it
was revised at the convention in Weimar, Flacius secured the adoption of
additions and changes dealing particularly with the synergism of the
Wittenbergers, which were energetically opposed by Strigel.

Even before the adoption of the _Book of Confutation,_ Strigel had been
polemicizing against Flacius. But now (as Flacius reports) he began to
denounce him at every occasion as the "architect of a new theology" and
an "enemy of the _Augsburg Confession._" At the same time he also
endeavored to incite the students in Jena against him. Flacius, in turn,
charged Strigel with scheming to establish a Philippistic party in Ducal
Saxony. The public breach came when the _Book of Confutation_ was
submitted for adoption and publication in the churches and schools.
Pastor Huegel refused to read and explain it from the pulpit, and
Strigel presented his objections to the Duke, and asked that his
conscience be spared. But when Strigel failed to maintain silence in the
matter, he as well as Pastor Huegel were summarily dealt with by the
Duke. On March 27, 1559, at two o'clock in the morning, both were
suddenly arrested and imprisoned. Flacius who was generally regarded as
the secret instigator of this act of violence, declared publicly that
the arrest had been made without his counsel and knowledge. About six
months later (September 5, 1569) Strigel and Huegel after making some
doctrinal concessions and promising not to enter into any disputation on
the Confutation, were set at liberty. (Planck 4, 591. 604.)

159. Weimar Disputation.

In order to settle the differences, Flacius and his colleagues (Wigand,
Judex, Simon Musaeus), as well as Strigel, asked for a public
disputation, which John Frederick, too was all the more willing to
arrange because dissatisfaction with his drastic procedure against
Strigel and Huegel was openly displayed everywhere outside of Ducal
Saxony. The disputation was held at Weimar, August 2 to 8, 1560. It was
attended by the Saxon Dukes and their entire courts, as well as by a
large number of other spectators, not only from Jena, but also from
Erfurt, Wittenberg and Leipzig. The subjects of discussion, for which
both parties had submitted theses were: Free Will, Gospel, Majorism,
Adiaphorism, and Indifferentism (_academica epoche,_ toleration of
error). The disputing parties (Flacius and Strigel) agreed that "the
only rule should be the Word of God, and that a clear, plain text of the
Holy Scriptures was to weigh more than all the inferences and
authorities of interpreters" (Planck 4, 606.)

According to the proceedings of the Weimar Disputation, written by
Wigand and published by Simon Musaeus 1562 and 1563 under the title:
"_Disputatio de Originali Peccato et Libero Arbitrio_ inter M. Flacium
Illyr. et Vict. Strigelium Publice Vinariae Anno 1560 Habita," the only
questions discussed were free will and, incidentally, original sin.
Strigel defended the Melanchthonian doctrine, according to which the
causes of conversion are the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, and the will
of man feebly assenting to the Gospel and, at the same time, seeking
strength from God. He repeated the formula: "Concurrunt in conversione
haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis,
quae voci divinae assentitur." Flacius, on the other hand, defended the
_mere passive_ of Luther, according to which man, before he is converted
and endowed with faith, does not in any way cooperate with the Holy
Spirit but merely suffers and experiences His operations. At the same
time, however, he seriously damaged and discredited himself as well as
the sacred cause of divine truth by maintaining that original sin is not
a mere accident, such as Strigel maintained, but the very substance of
man. The discussions were discontinued after the thirteenth session. The
Duke announced that the disputation would be reopened later, charging
both parties in the mean time to maintain silence in public,--a
compromise to which Flacius and his adherents were loath to consent.

John Wigand and Matthias Judex however continued to enforce the _Book of
Confutation_ demanding an unqualified adoption in every point, _per
omnia._ When the jurist Matthew Wesenbecius declined to accept the book
in this categorical way, he was not permitted to serve as sponsor at a
baptism. John Frederick was dissatisfied with this procedure and action
of the ministers; and when they persisted in their demands, the
autocratic Duke deprived them of the right to excommunicate, vesting
this power in a consistory established at Weimar. Flacius and his
adherents protested against this measure as tyranny exercised over the
Church and a suppression of the pure doctrine. As a result Musaeus,
Judex, Wigand, and Flacius were suspended and expelled from Jena,
December, 1561. (Gieseler 3, 2, 244. 247.) Their vacant chairs at the
university were filled by Freihub, Salmuth, and Selneccer, who had been
recommended by the Wittenberg Philippists at the request of the Duke,
who now evidently favored a compromise with the Synergists. Strigel,
too, was reinstated at Jena after signing an ambiguous declaration.

Amsdorf, Gallus, Hesshusius, Flacius, and the other exiled theologians
denounced Strigel's declaration as insincere and in conflict with
Luther's book _De Servo Arbitrio,_ and demanded a public retraction of
his synergistic statements. When the ministers of Ducal Saxony also
declined to acknowledge Strigel's orthodoxy, a more definite
"Superdeclaration," framed by Moerlin and Stoessel (but not signed by
Strigel), was added as an interpretation of Strigel's declaration. But
even now a minority refused to submit to the demands of the Duke,
because they felt that they were being deceived by ambiguous terms, such
as "capacity" and "aptitude," which the wily Strigel and the Synergists
used in the active or positive, and not in the passive sense. These
conscientious Lutherans whom the rationalist Planck brands as "almost
insane, _beinahe verrueckt,_" were also deposed and banished, 1562.
Strigel's declaration of March, 1562 however, maintaining that "the will
is passive in so far as God alone works all good, but active in so far
as it must be present in its conversion, must consent, and not resist,
but accept," showed that he had not abandoned his synergism. In the same
year he applied for, and accepted, a professorship in Leipzig. Later on
he occupied a chair at the Reformed university in Heidelberg, where he
died 1569, at the age of only forty-five years.

In 1567, when John William became ruler of Ducal Saxony, the Philippists
were dismissed, and the banished Lutheran pastors and professors (with
the exception of Flacius) were recalled and reinstated. While this
rehabilitation of the loyal Lutherans formally ended the synergistic
controversy in Ducal Saxony, occasional echoes of it still lingered, due
especially to the fact that some ministers had considered Strigel's
ambiguous declaration a satisfactory presentation of the Lutheran truth
with regard to the questions involved. That the synergistic teaching of
Melanchthon was continued in Wittenberg appears, for example, from the
_Confessio Wittenbergica_ of 1570.

160. Strigel's Rationalistic Principle.

Although at the opening of the disputation the debaters had agreed to
decide all questions by clear Scripture-passages alone, Strigel's
guiding principle was in reality not the Bible but philosophy and
reason. His real concern was not, What does Scripture teach concerning
the causes of conversion? but, How may we harmonize the universal grace
of God with the fact that only some are converted and saved?
Self-evidently Strigel, too, quoted Bible-passages. Among others, he
appealed to such texts as John 6, 29; Rom. 1, 16; 10, 17; Luke 8, 18;
Heb. 4, 2; Rev. 3, 20; Luke 11, 13; Mark 9, 24; 1 Thess. 2, 13; Jas. 1,
18. But as we shall show later, his deductions were philosophical and
sophistical rather than exegetical and Scriptural. Preger remarks: In
his disputation Strigel was not able to advance a single decisive
passage of Scripture for the presence and cooperation of a good will at
the moment when it is approached and influenced (_ergriffen_) by grace.
(2, 211.) And the clear, irrefutable Bible-texts on which Flacius
founded his doctrine of the inability of natural will to cooperate in
conversion, Strigel endeavored to invalidate by philosophical reasoning,
indirect arguing, and alleged necessary logical consequences.

At Weimar and in his _Confession_ of December 5 1560, delivered to the
Duke soon after the disputation, Strigel argued: Whoever denies that
man, in a way and measure, is able to cooperate in his own conversion
is logically compelled also to deny that the rejection of grace may be
imputed to man, compelled to make God responsible for man's damnation;
to surrender the universality of God's grace and call; to admit
contradictory wills in God, and to take recourse to an absolute decree
of election and reprobation in order to account for the fact that some
reject the grace of God and are lost while others are converted and
saved. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not say that the will is able
to assent to the Word without the Holy Spirit, but that, being moved and
assisted by the Spirit, it assents with trepidation. If we were unable
to do this, we would not be responsible for not having received the
Word. _Si hoc [utcumque assentiri inter trepidationes] non possemus, non
essemus rei propter Verbum non receptum._" Again, also at Weimar: "If
the will is not able to assent in some way, even when assisted, then we
cannot be responsible for rejecting the Word, but the blame must be
transferred to another, and others may judge how religious that is. _Si
voluntas ne quidem adiuta potest aliquo modo annuere, non possumus esse
rei propter Verbum reiectum, sed culpa est in alium transferenda quod
quam sit religio sum, alii iudicent._" (Planck 4, 689. 719; Luthardt,
_Lehre vom freien Willen,_ 222.)

Over against this rationalistic method of Strigel and the Synergists
generally, the Lutherans adhered to the principle that nothing but a
clear passage of the Bible can decide a theological question. They
rejected as false philosophy and rationalism every argument directed
against the clear sense of a clear Word of God. They emphatically
objected to the employment of reason for establishing a Christian
doctrine or subverting a statement of the Bible. At Weimar, Flacius
protested again and again that human reason is not an authority in
theological matters. "Let us hear the Scriptures! _Audiamus
Scripturam!_" "Let the woman be silent in the Church! _Mulier taceat in
ecclesia!_" With such slogans he brushed aside the alleged necessary
logical inferences and deductions of Strigel. "You take your arguments
from philosophy," he said in the second session, "which ought not to be
given a place in matters of religion. _Disputas ex philosophia, cui
locus in rebus religionis esse non debet._" Again, at Weimar: "It is
against the nature of inquiring truth to insist on arguing from blind
philosophy. What else corrupted such ancient theologians as Clement,
Origen, Chrysostom, and afterwards also the Sophists [scholastic
theologians] but that they endeavored to decide spiritual things by
philosophy, which does not understand the secret and hidden mysteries of
God. _Est contra naturam inquirendae veritatis, si velimus ex caeca
philosophia loqui. Quid aliud corrupit theologos veteres, ut Clementem,
Originem, Chrysosthomum et postea etiam Sophistas, nisi quod de rebus
divinis ex philosophia voluerunt statuere, quae non intelligit
abstrusissima et occultissima mysteria Dei._" "May we therefore observe
the rule of Luther: Let the woman be silent in the Church! For what a
miserable thing would it be if we had to judge ecclesiastical matters
from logic! _Itaque observemus legem Lutheri: Taceat mulier in ecclesia!
Quae enim miseria, si ex dialectica diiudicandae nobis essent res
ecclesiae!_" (Planck 4, 709.)

In an antisynergistic confession published by Schluesselburg, we read:
"This doctrine [of conversion by God's grace alone] is simple, clear,
certain, and irrefutable if one looks to God's Word alone and derives
the _Nosce teipsum,_ Know thyself, from the wisdom of God. But since
poor men are blind, they love their darkness more than the light, as
Christ says John 3, and insist on criticizing and falsifying God's
truth by means of blind philosophy, which, forsooth, is a shame and a
palpable sin, if we but had eyes to see and know.... Whatsoever blind
reason produces in such articles of faith against the Word of God is
false and wrong. For it is said: _Mulier in ecclesia taceat!_ Let
philosophy and human wisdom be silent in the Church." (_Catalogus_ 5,
665f.) Here, too, the sophistical objections of the Synergists are
disposed of with such remarks as: "In the first place, this is but spun
from reason, which thus acts wise in these matters. _Denn fuers erste
ist solches nur aus der Vernunft gesponnen, die weiss also hierin zu
kluegeln._" (668.) "This is all spun from reason; but God's Word teaches
us better. _Dies ist alles aus der Vernunft spintisiert; Gottes Wort
aber lehrt es besser._" (670.)

Evidently Strigel's rationalistic method was identical with that
employed by Melanchthon in his _Loci,_ by Pfeffinger, and the Synergists
generally. Accordingly, his synergism also could not differ essentially
from Melanchthon's. Planck pertinently remarks: "It is apparent from
this [argument of Strigel that natural man must have power to cooperate
in his conversion because otherwise God would be responsible for his
resistance and damnation] that his synergism was none other than that of
the Wittenberg school; for was not this the identical foundation upon
which Melanchthon had reared his [synergism]?" (4, 690.) Like methods
lead to the same results, and _vice versa._ Besides, Strigel had always
appealed to the Wittenbergers; and in his _Opinion on the Weimar
Confutation_ 1559, Melanchthon, in turn, identified himself with
Strigel's arguments. (_C. R._ 9, 766.) The "Confession and Opinion of
the Wittenbergers Concerning Free Will--_Confessio et Sententia
Wittebergensium de Libero Arbitrio_" of 1561 also maintained the same
attitude.

161. Strigel's Theory.

Strigel's views concerning the freedom of man's will in spiritual
matters may be summarized as follows: Man, having a will, is a free
agent, hence always able to decide for or against. This ability is the
"mode of action" essential to man as long as he really is a man and in
possession of a will. Even in matters pertaining to grace this freedom
was not entirely lost in the Fall. It was impeded and weakened by
original sin, but not annihilated. To be converted, man therefore
requires that these residual or remaining powers be excited and
strengthened rather than that new spiritual powers be imparted or a new
will be created. Accordingly, persuasion through the Word is the method
of conversion employed by the Holy Spirit. When the will is approached
by the Word, incited and assisted by the Spirit, it is able to admit the
operations of the Spirit and assent to the Word, though but feebly.
Hence, no matter how much of the work of conversion must be ascribed to
the Holy Spirit and the Word the will itself, in the last analysis,
decides for or against grace. Man is, therefore, not purely passive in
his conversion, but cooperates with the Holy Spirit and the Word, not
merely after, but also in his conversion, before he has received the
gift of faith.

"God who, outside of His essence in external actions, is the freest
agent," said Strigel "created two kinds of natures, the one free, the
other acting naturally (_naturaliter agentes_). The free natures are the
angels and men. Those acting naturally embrace all the rest of the
creatures. A natural agent is one that cannot do anything else [than it
does], nor suspend its action _e.g._, fire. Men and angels were created
differently, after the image of God, that they might be free agents.
_Homines et angeli aliter conditi sunt ad imaginem Dei, ut sint liberum
agens._" (Planck 4, 669.) This freedom, which distinguishes man
essentially from all other creatures, according to Strigel, always
implies the power to will or not to will with respect to any object. He
says: The act of willing, be it good or evil, always belongs to the
will, because the will is so created that it can will or not, without
coercion. "_Ipsum velle, seu bonum seu malum, quod ad substantiam
attinet, semper est voluntatis; quia voluntas sic est condita, UT POSSIT
VELLE AUT NON; sed etiam hoc habet voluntas ex opere creationis quod
adhuc reliquum, et non prorsus abolitum et extinctum est, UT POSSIT
VELLE AUT NON SINE COACTIONE_." (674.) According to Strigel, the very
essence of the will consists in being able, in every instance, to decide
in either direction, for or against. Hence the very idea of will
involves also a certain ability to cooperate in conversion. (689.)

This freedom or ability to decide _pro_ or _con,_ says Strigel, is the
mode of action essential to man, his mode of action also in conversion.
And in the controversy on free will he sought to maintain that this
alleged mode of action was a part of the very essence of the human will
and being. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not wish to detract from
the will the mode of action which is different from other natural
actions. _Nolo voluntati detrahi modum agendi, qui est dissimilis aliis
actionibus naturalibus._" (Planck 4, 668.) Again: "The will is not a
natural, but a free agent; hence the will is converted not as a natural
agent, but as a free agent.... In conversion the will acts in its own
mode; it is not a statue or a log in conversion. Hence conversion does
not occur in a purely passive manner. _Voluntas non est agens naturale,
sed liberum; ergo convertitur voluntas non ut naturaliter agens, sed ut
liberum agens.... Et voluntas suo modo agit in conversione, nec est
statua vel truncus in conversione. Et per consequens non fit conversio
pure passive._" (Luthardt, 217. 219. 209.)

What Strigel means is that man, being a free agent, must, also in
conversion, be accorded the ability somehow to decide for grace.
According to the _Formula of Concord_ the words, "man's mode of action,"
signify "a way of working something good and salutary in divine things."
(905, 61.) The connection and the manner in which the phrase was
employed by Strigel admitted of no other interpretation. Strigel added:
This mode of action marks the difference between the will of man and the
will of Satan, for the devil neither endeavors to assent, nor prays to
God for assistance, while man does. (Luthardt, 220.) Natural man is by
Strigel credited with the power of "endeavoring to assent, _conari
assentiri,_" because he is endowed with a will. But shrewd as Strigel
was, it did not occur to him that, logically, his argument compelled him
to ascribe also to the devils everything he claimed for natural man,
since they, too, have a will and are therefore endowed with the same
_modus agendi,_ which, according to Strigel, belongs to the very idea
and essence of will. Yet this palpable truth, which overthrew his entire
theory, failed to open the eyes of Strigel.

If, as Strigel maintained, the human will, by virtue of its nature as a
free agent, is, in a way, _able_ to cooperate in conversion, then the
only question is how to elevate this ability to an actuality, in other
words, how to influence the will and rouse its powers to move in the
right direction. Strigel answered: Since the will cannot be forced,
moral suasion is the true method required to convert a man. "The will,"
says he "cannot be forced, hence it is by persuasion, _i.e._, by
pointing out something good or evil, that the will is moved to obey and
to submit to the Gospel, not coerced, _but somehow willing. Voluntas non
potest cogi, ergo voluntas persuadendo, id est ostensione alicuius boni
vel mali flectitur ad obediendum et obtemperandum evangelio, non coacta,
sed ALIQUO MODO VOLENS._" (Seeberg 4, 491.) Again: "Although God is
efficacious through the Word, drawing and leading us efficaciously, yet
He does not make assenting necessary for such a nature as the will,--a
nature so created that it is able not to assent, if it so wills, and to
expel Him who dwells in us. This assent therefore is the work of God and
the Holy Spirit, but in so far as it is a free assent, not coerced and
pressed out by force, _it is also the work of the will. Etiam si Deus
est efficax per Verbum et efficaciter nos trahit et ducit, tamen non
affert necessitatem assentiendi tali naturae, qualis est voluntas, id
est, quae sic est condita, ut possit non assentiri, si velit, et
excutere sessorem. Est igitur hic assensus opus Dei et Spiritus Sancti,
sed quatenus est liber assensus, non coactus, expressus vi, EST ETIAM
VOLUNTATIS._" (491.) Strigel evidently means: The fact that man is able
not to assent to grace of necessity involves that somehow (_aliquo
modo_) he is able also to assent, according to man's peculiar mode of
action (freedom) he must himself actualize his conversion by previously
(in the logical order) willing it, deciding for it, and assenting to it;
he would be converted by coercion if his assent to grace were an act of
the will engendered and created solely by God, rather than an act
effected and produced by the powers of the will when incited and
assisted by the Spirit. Man is converted by persuasion only, because God
does not create assent and faith in him but merely elicits these acts
from man by liberating and appealing to the powers of his will to effect
and produce them.

In defending this freedom of the will, Strigel appealed also to the
statement of Luther: "The will cannot be coerced;... if the will could
be coerced, it would not be volition, but rather nolition. _Voluntas non
potest cogi;... si posset cogi voluntas, non esset voluntas sed potius
voluntas._" However, what Luther said of the form or nature of the will,
according to which it always really wills what it wills, and is
therefore never coerced, was by Strigel transferred to the spiritual
matters and objects of the will. According to Strigel's theory, says
Seeberg, "the will must be free even in the first moment of conversion,
free not only in the psychological, but also in the moral sense." (4,
492.) Tschackert, quoting Seeberg remarks that Strigel transformed the
natural formal liberty into an ethical material liberty--_"indem die
natuerliche formale Freiheit sich ihm unter der Hand [?] verwandelte in
die ethische materiale Freiheit._" (524.)

162. Strigel's Semi-Pelagianism.

Strigel's entire position is based on the error that a remnant of
spiritual ability still remains in natural man. True, he taught that in
consequence of original sin the powers of man and the proper use and
exercise of these powers are greatly impeded, weakened, checked, and
insulated, as it were, and that this impediment can be removed solely by
the operation of the Holy Spirit. "Through the Word the Holy Spirit
restores to the will the power and faculty of believing," Strigel
declared. (Luthardt, 250.) But this restoration, he said, was brought
about by liberating, arousing, inciting, and strengthening the powers
inherent in man rather than by divine impartation of new spiritual
powers or by the creation of a new good volition.

Strigel plainly denied that natural man is truly spiritually dead. He
declared: "The will is so created that it can expel the Holy Spirit and
the Word, or, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, can in some manner will
and obey--to receive is the act of the will; in this I cannot concede
that man is simply _dead--accipere est hominis; in hoc non possum
concedere simpliciter mortuum esse hominem._" (Frank 1, 199.) Natural
man, Strigel explained, is indeed not able to grasp the helping hand of
God with his own hand; yet the latter is not dead, but still retains a
minimum of power. (678.) Again: Man is like a new-born child, whose
powers must first be strengthened with nourishment given it by its
mother, and which, _though able to draw this nourishment out of its
mother's breast,_ is yet unable to lift itself up to it, or to take hold
of the breast, unless it be given it. (Preger 2, 209.)

With special reference to the last illustration, Flacius declared:
"Strigel, accordingly, holds that we have the faculty to desire and
receive the food, _i.e._, the benefits of God. Forsooth, you thereby
attribute to corrupt man a very great power with respect to spiritual
things. Now, then, deny that this opinion is Pelagian." (209.) "Your
statements agree with those of Pelagius, yet I do not simply say that
you are a Pelagian; for a good man may fall into an error which he does
not see." Pelagius held that man, by his natural powers, is able to
begin and complete his own conversion; Cassianus, the Semi-Pelagian
taught that man is able merely to begin this work; Strigel maintained
that man can admit the liberating operation of the Holy Spirit, and that
after such operation of the Spirit he is able to cooperate with his
natural powers. Evidently, then, the verdict of Flacius was not much
beside the mark. Planck though unwilling to relegate Strigel to the
Pelagians, does not hesitate to put him down as a thoroughgoing
Synergist. (Planck 4, 683f.) Synergism, however, always includes at
least an element of Pelagianism.

Strigel illustrated his idea by the following analogy. When garlic-juice
is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a
true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its
efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from
beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed
through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will
again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672;
Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: "The example of the
temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this
juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the
related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of
the _Tridentinum_ to this effect: The free will of natural man may be
compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his
locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters." (1, 136.)
Also the _Formula of Concord,_ evidently with a squint at Strigel,
rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching "that original sin is not a
despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these
spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice,
whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this
stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment
from the wall." (865, 22.)

163. Strigel's "Cooperation."

When the impediment caused by original sin has been removed, and the
will liberated and aroused to activity, man, according to Strigel, is
able also to cooperate in his conversion. At Weimar he formulated the
point at issue as follows: "The question is whether [in conversion] the
will is present idle, as an inactive, indolent subject, or, as the
common saying is, in a purely passive way; or whether, when grace
precedes, the will follows the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and in some
manner assents--_an vero praeeunte gratia voluntas comitetur
efficaciam Spiritus Sancti et aliquo modo annuat_." (Luthardt, 222.)
Following are some of his answers to this question: When incited by the
Spirit, the will is able to assent somewhat and to pray for assistance.
_Inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur, simul petens auxilium._
Contrition and faith, as well as other virtues, are gifts of God, "but
they are given to those only who hear and contemplate God's Word,
embrace it by assenting to it, strive against their doubts and in this
conflict pray for the help of God." (230.) The Holy Ghost converts
those "who hear the Word of God and do not resist stubbornly, but
consent," and God assists such only "as follow His call and pray for
assistance." (229.) "The will and heart do not resist altogether, but
desire divine consolation, when, indeed, they are assisted by the Holy
Ghost." "The will is neither idle nor contumacious; but, in a manner,
desires to obey." (Planck 4, 682.) "Man is dead [spiritually] in as far
as he is not able to heal his wounds with his own powers; but when the
remedy is offered him by the Holy Spirit and the Word, then he, at
least in receiving the benefit, is not altogether dead; for otherwise a
conversion could not occur. For I cannot conceive a conversion where
the process is that of the flame consuming straw (_denn ich kann mir
keine Bekehrung vorstellen, bei der es zugeht, wie wenn die Flamme das
Stroh ergreift_). The nature of the will is such that it can reject the
Holy Spirit and the Word; or, being supported by the Holy Spirit, can
in a manner will and obey. The remedy is heavenly and divine, but the
will--not the will alone, but the will supported by the Holy Spirit--is
able to accept it. One must ascribe at least a feeble consent and an
'Aye' to the will, which is already supported by the Holy Spirit."
(Preger 2, 208.) "In a betrothal, consent is necessary; conversion is a
betrothal of Christ to the Church and its individual members; hence
consent is required," which the will is able to give when assisted by
the Holy Spirit. (Luthardt, 224.)

It is, however, only a languid, wavering, and weak consent which man is
able to render (_qualiscumque assensio languida, trepida et imbecilla_).
"Compared with the divine operation," Flacius reports Strigel as having
said, "the cooperation of our powers in conversion is something
extremely small (_quiddam pertenue prorsus_). If, after drinking with a
rich man, he paying a _taler_ and I a _heller,_ I would afterwards boast
that I had been drinking and paying with him--such is cooperation,
_talis est synergia._" (Planck 4, 677; Luthardt, 220. 222.) According to
Strigel, therefore, man is not purely passive, but plays an active part
in his conversion. With Melanchthon and Pfeffinger he maintained: "These
three concur in conversion: the Holy Spirit, who moves the hearts; the
voice of God; the will of man, which assents to the divine voice.
_Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox
Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae assentitur._" (Tschackert,
524.)

Flacius declared with respect to the issue formulated by Strigel: "I
explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely passive (_homo se habet
pure passive_). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its
willing and its powers, then he is purely passive when he receives (_in
accipiendo_). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith
kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this
spark is not purely passive. But the Adamic will does not only not
operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart,
even operates contrarily (_verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui
contra operatur_)." (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished
between cooperation _before_ conversion (which he rejected absolutely)
and cooperation _after_ conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this
point, he said to Strigel: "I ask whether you say that the will
cooperates _before_ the gift of faith or _after_ faith has been received
whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so
far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy
Spirit. _Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut
post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut
quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle._" (Seeberg
4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will
declare it as your opinion "that only the regenerated, sanctified,
renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will."
"Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man
cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by God, not from the
will he brings with him from his natural Adam--_quod homo cooperetur ex
fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo
naturali Adamo.'_" "We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you
[Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end." Strigel, however,
who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to
catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but
repeated that it was only a weak assent (_qualiscumque assensio languida
trepida et imbecilla_) which man was able to render when his will was
incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit.
(Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)

164. Objections Answered.

At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as
one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no
conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in
conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences
conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing
to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely passive in the
reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the
sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge
and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that
good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?"
(216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of
the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not
whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but
whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing
of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of
willing and thinking of God alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that God
alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the
will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the
natural will in conversion (_non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed
excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in
conversione_)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)

In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared:
"Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of God and of
ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will.
_Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit
velle aut perficere nisi nobis volentibus._" Charging Strigel with
ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we
of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these
questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to
see the difference, answered: "For God's sake, have a little forbearance
with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it
be to my discredit.--_Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut
halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's
eine Schand'_." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that
man, too, has a share in _producing_ the good volition, while Flacius
understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the
latter, _e.g._, writing in _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:_ "It is
certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of
whom it is written: It is God who worketh in us to will. _Certum est nos
velle cum volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus
est, qui operatur in nobis velle._" (Frank 1, 238.)

In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely passive in his
conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a
block or stone when he is converted. "That is true," said Flacius, "for
a block can neither love nor hate God, while man by nature hates God,
and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus God is dealing with one
whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial
that man is purely passive in conversion] is buried a popish _meritum de
congruo_ and a particle of free will." (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius
furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate
just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a
statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a
stone or block (_miserior trunco_), because by his natural powers he
resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4,
696f.)

Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he
cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an
impossibility, a contradiction. He said: "If the will, even when
assisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to assent, it must of necessity
resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and
Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and
contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently
rejecting, should be in the same will. _Si voluntas etiam adiuta a
Spiritu Sancto non potest assentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei
repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verbum et Spiritum Sanctum.
Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et
contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem
perstare in reiectione._" Flacius replied: You need but distinguish
between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always
resists, and the new consenting will implanted by God in conversion.
"Man consents with the faith given by God, but he resists with the
inborn wickedness of his Old Adam." Your error is that you acknowledge
only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of
one's own to do and to perform (_talis incitatio includit proprias vires
ad perficiendum_). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is
not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his
faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other
hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (_hominem ...
penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra
insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum_)." "The will is free with respect to
things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In
spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in
order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and
created in, man by the grace of God. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff.,
Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)

Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of
God, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied:
"Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their
actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at
least to observe external decency (_Zucht_), which God earnestly demands
of us, for example, to hear God's Word, to go to church more frequently
than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal
transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he
has not done." "God may justly hold us responsible also with respect to
things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured
powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully
lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)

Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man
is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of God. But the
latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will
of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (_voluntas
repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter_), but not by coercion or
compulsion. Necessity to resist (_necessitas repugnandi_), Flacius
explained, does not involve coercion to resist (_coactio repugnandi_),
since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (_necessitas
immutabilitatis_), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and
yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise
than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve
coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion,
although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of
freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to
remain in union with God is elevated to immutability of so willing.
Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus
too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet
there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man
cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he
is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced
to resist prove that he is able also to assent to grace. The fact, said
Flacius, that the wicked _willingly_ will, think, and do only what
pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite
spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's
tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to
Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills.
In brief: The categories "coercion" and "compulsion" cannot be applied
to the will. This, however, does not imply that God is not able to
create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was
no coercion or compulsion involved when God, creating Adam, Eve, and the
angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as
coercion or compulsion when God, in conversion, bestows faith and a good
will upon man.

In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated
what Luther had written before him, in _De Servo Arbitrio:_ "For if it
is not we, but God alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that
we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But
when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say
by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, _i.e._,
man, destitute of the Spirit of God, does not sin perforce, as though
seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief
or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And
by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or
willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it.
For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else,
within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who
compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to
force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of
immutability, _i.e._, the will cannot change itself and turn to
something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being
resisted, as is proved by its indignation. _Si enim non nos, sed solus
Deus operatur salutem in nobis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare,
velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dicunt,
necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est homo cum vacat
Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS
facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed
sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem
faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed
pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per
vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut
resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim
sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod
voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur
magis ad volendum, dum ei resistitur, quod probat eius indignatio._" (E.
v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)

Flacius was also charged with teaching that "man is converted resisting
(_hominem converti repugnantem_)." In their _Confession and Opinion
Concerning Free Will,_ of 1561, the Wittenberg theologians repeated the
assertion that Flacius taught "_converti hominem ... repugnantem et
hostiliter Deo convertenti adversantem._" (Planck 4, 688.) But Flacius
protested: "I do not simply say that man is converted resisting
(_hominem repugnantem converti_). But I say that he resists with respect
to his natural and carnal free will." "It is not denied that God
converts us as willing and understanding (_quin Deus nos convertat
volentes et intelligentes_), but willing and understanding not from the
Old Adam but from the light given by God and from the good volition
bestowed through the Word and the Holy Spirit." (692.) "Man is converted
or drawn by the Father to the Son not as a thief is cast into prison,
but in such a manner that his evil will is changed into a good will by
the power of the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 218.) It is the very essence
of conversion that by the grace of God unwilling men are made willing.

In support of his error that natural man is able to cooperate in his
conversion Strigel appealed to Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also
helpeth our infirmities," etc.; and appealing to the _Augustana_ for the
correctness of his interpretation, he declared that this passage proves
that one may speak of a languid and weak assent in man even before he is
endowed with faith. Flacius replied that this Bible-passage referred to
such only as are already converted, and that Strigel's interpretation
was found not in the original _Augustana,_ but in the _Variata._--From
the admonition 2 Cor. 5, 20: "Be ye reconciled to God," Strigel inferred
that free will must to a certain extent be capable of accepting the
grace offered by God. Flacius answered that it was a logical fallacy,
conflicting also with the clear Word of God, to conclude that man by his
own powers is able to perform something because God demands it and
admonishes and urges us to do it.--From Acts 5, 32: "...the Holy Ghost,
whom God hath given to them that obey Him," Strigel argued that the will
is able to consent to the Holy Spirit. But Flacius rejoined that this
passage refers to special gifts bestowed upon such as are already
converted.--In support of his synergism, Strigel also appealed to the
Parable of the Prodigal Son, who himself repented and returned to his
father. But Flacius answered: If every detail of this parable taken from
every-day life were to be interpreted in such a manner, Strigel would
have to abandon his own teaching concerning prevenient grace, since
according to the parable the repentance and return of the son precedes
the grace bestowed by the father. (Preger 2, 210f.)

165. Teaching of the Anti-Synergists.

While the Philippists, also in the Synergistic Controversy, endeavored
to supplant the authority and doctrine of Luther by that of Melanchthon,
their opponents, Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others
(though not always fortunate in the choice of their phraseology), stood
four-square on Luther's teaching of the _sola gratia,_ which, they were
fully convinced, was nothing but the pure truth of the Gospel itself.
They maintained that, as a result of the Fall, man has lost his original
holiness and righteousness or the image of God; that both as to his
intellect and will he is totally corrupt spiritually; that of his own
powers he is utterly unable to think or will anything that is truly
good; that not a spark of spiritual life is found in natural man by
virtue of which he might assent to the Gospel or cooperate with the Holy
Spirit in his conversion; that his carnal mind is enmity toward God;
that of his own powers he is active only in resisting the work of the
Holy Spirit, nor is he able to do otherwise; that such resistance
continues until he is converted and a new will and heart have been
created in him; that conversion consists in this, that men who by nature
are unwilling and resist God's grace become such as willingly consent
and obey the Gospel and the Holy Spirit; that this is done solely by
God's grace, through Word and Sacrament; that man is purely passive in
his conversion, inasmuch as he contributes nothing towards it, and
merely suffers and experiences the work of the Holy Spirit; that only
after his conversion man is able to cooperate with the Holy Spirit; that
such cooperation, however, flows not from innate powers of the natural
will, but from the new powers imparted in conversion; that also in the
converted the natural sinful will continues to oppose whatever is truly
good, thus causing a conflict between the flesh and the spirit which
lasts till death; in brief, that man's conversion and salvation are due
to grace alone and in no respect whatever to man and his natural powers.

The _Book of Confutation,_ of 1559, drafted, as stated above, by the
theologians of Jena, designates the synergistic dogma as a "rejection of
grace." Here we also meet with statements such as the following: Human
nature "is altogether turned aside from God, and is hostile toward Him
and subject to the tyranny of sin and Satan (_naturam humanam prorsus a
Deo aversam eique inimicam et tyrannidi peccati ac Satanae subiectam
esse_)." It is impossible for the unregenerate man "to understand or to
apprehend the will of God revealed in the Word, or by his own power to
convert himself to God and to will or perform anything good (_homini non
renato impossibile esse intelligere aut apprehendere voluntatem Dei in
Verbo patefactam aut sua ipsius voluntate ad Deum se convertere, boni
aliquid velle aut perficere_)." "Our will to obey God or to choose the
good is utterly extinguished and corrupted. _Voluntas nostra ad Dei
obedientiam aut ad bonum eligendum prorsus extincta et depravata est_."
(Tschackert, 523; Gieseler 3, 2, 229.)

The second of the Propositions prepared by Simon Musaeus and Flacius for
the Disputation at Weimar, 1560, reads: "Corrupt man cannot operate or
cooperate toward anything good by true motions, and such as proceed from
the heart; for his heart is altogether dead spiritually, and has utterly
lost the image of God, or all powers and inclinations toward that which
is good. _Homo corruptus nihil boni potest veris ac ex corde
proficiscentibus motibus operari aut cooperari, nom plane est
spiritualiter mortuus et Dei imaginem seu omnes bonas vires et
inclinationes prorsus amisit._" The third: Not only "has he lost
entirely all good powers, but, in addition, he has also acquired
contrary and most evil powers, ... so that, of necessity or inevitably,
he constantly and vehemently opposes God and true piety (_ita [tr. note:
sic on punctuation] ut necessario seu inevitabiliter Deo ac verae
pietati semper et vehementer adversetur._" The fourth thesis states that
God alone, through His Word and the Holy Spirit, converts, draws, and
illumines man, kindles faith, justifies, renews, and creates him unto
good works, while natural or Adamic free will is of itself not only
inactive, but resists (_non solum non cooperante ex se naturali aut
Adamico libero arbitrio, sed etiam contra furente ac fremente_). (Planck
4, 692; Gieseler 3, 2, 245.)

The same position was occupied by the Mansfeld ministers in a statement
of August 20, 1562, and by Hesshusius in his _Confutation of the
Arguments by which the Synergists Endeavor to Defend Their Error
Concerning the Powers of the Dead Free Will_. They held that in his
conversion man is purely passive and has no mode of action whatever;
that he is but the passive subject who is to be converted (_subiectam
patiens, subiectum convertendum_); that he contributes no more to his
conversion than an infant to its own formation in the womb of its
mother; that he is passive, like a block, inasmuch as he does not in any
way cooperate, but at the same time differs from, and is worse than, a
block, because he is active in resisting the Holy Spirit until he has
been converted. The _Confession_ presented by the theologians of Ducal
Saxony (Wigand, Coelestinus, Irenaeus, Rosinus, Kirchner, etc.) at the
Altenburg Colloquy March, 1569, occupies the same doctrinal position. As
stated before, these theologians made it a special point also to declare
their agreement with Luther's book _De Servo Arbitrio_. (Schluesselburg
5, 316. 133.)

166. Attitude of Formula of Concord.

The second article of the _Formula of Concord_, which decided the
questions involved in the Synergistic Controversy, takes a clear,
determined, and consistent stand against all forms and formulas of
synergism. At the same time it avoids all extravagant, improper,
offensive, and inadequate terms and phrases, as well as the numerous
pitfalls lurking everywhere in the questions concerning free will,
against which also some of the opponents of the Synergists had not
always sufficiently been on their guard. Article II teaches "that
original sin is an unspeakable evil and such an entire corruption of
human nature that in it and all its internal and external powers nothing
pure or good remains, but everything is entirely corrupt, so that on
account of original sin man is in God's sight truly spiritually dead,
with all his powers dead to that which is good (_dass der Mensch durch
die Erbsuende wahrhaftig vor Gott geistlich tot und zum Guten mit allen
seinen Kraeften erstorben sei_)" (CONC. TRIGL. 879, 60); "that in
spiritual and divine things the intellect, heart, and will of the
unregenerate man are utterly unable, by their own natural powers, to
understand, believe, accept, think, will, begin, effect, work, or concur
in working, anything, but they are entirely dead to what is good, and
corrupt, so that in man's nature since the Fall, before regeneration,
there is not the least spark of spiritual power remaining, nor present,
by which, of himself, he can prepare himself for God's grace, or accept
the offered grace, nor be capable of it for and of himself, or apply or
accommodate himself thereto, or by his own powers be able of himself, as
of himself, to aid, do, work, or concur in working anything towards his
conversion either wholly, or half, or in any, even the least or most
inconsiderable part; but that he is the servant [and slave] of sin, John
8, 34, and a captive of the devil, by whom he is moved, Eph. 2, 2;
2 Tim. 2, 26. Hence natural free will according to its perverted
disposition and nature is strong and active only with respect to what is
displeasing and contrary to God" (883, 7; 887, 17); that "before man is
enlightened, converted, regenerated, renewed and drawn by the Holy
Spirit he can of himself and of his own natural powers begin work, or
concur in working in spiritual things and in his own conversion or
regeneration just as little as a stone or a block or clay." (891, 24);
that, moreover, "in this respect" [inasmuch as man resists the Holy
Spirit] "it may well be said that man is not a stone or block, for a
stone or block does not resist the person who moves it, nor does it
understand and is sensible of what is being done with it, as man with
his will so long resists God the Lord until he is converted (_donec ad
Deum conversus fuerit_)" (905, 59); that "the Holy Scriptures ascribe
conversion, faith in Christ, regeneration, renewal, and all that belongs
to their efficacious beginning and completion, not to the human powers
of the natural free will, neither entirely, nor half nor in any, even
the least or most inconsiderable part, but _in solidum_, that is,
entirely and solely, to the divine working and the Holy Spirit" (891,
25); that "the preaching and hearing of God's Word are instruments of
the Holy Ghost, by, with, and through which He desires to work
efficaciously, and to convert men to God, and to work in them both to
will and to do" (901, 52); that "as soon as the Holy Ghost ... has begun
in us this His work of regeneration and renewal, it is certain that
through the power of the Holy Ghost we can and should cooperate
(_mitwirken_), although still in great weakness" (907, 65); that this
cooperation, however, "does not occur from our carnal natural powers,
but from the new powers and gifts which the Holy Ghost has begun in us
in conversion," and "is to be understood in no other way than that the
converted man does good to such an extent and so long as God by His Holy
Spirit rules, guides, and leads him, and that as soon as God would
withdraw His gracious hand from him, he could not for a moment persevere
in obedience to God," and that hence it is not a power independent from,
and coordinated with, the Holy Spirit, as though "the converted man
cooperated with the Holy Ghost in the manner as when two horses together
draw a wagon" (907, 66); and finally, that as to the
three-concurring-causes doctrine it is "manifest, from the explanations
presented that conversion to God is a work of God the Holy Ghost alone,
who is the true Master that alone works this in us, for which He uses
the preaching and hearing of His holy Word as His ordinary means and
instrument. But the intellect and will of the unregenerate man are
nothing else than _subiectum convertendum_, that is, that which is to be
converted, it being the intellect and will of a spiritually dead man, in
whom the Holy Ghost works conversion and renewal, towards which work
man's will that is to be converted does nothing, but suffers God alone
to work in him until he is regenerated and then he [cooperates] works
also with the Holy Ghost that which is pleasing to God in other good
works that follow in the way and to the extent fully set forth above"
(915, 90).

It has been said that originally also the _Formula of Concord_ in its
Torgau draft (_Das Torgausche Buch, i.e._, the draft preceding the
Bergic Book=_Formula of Concord_) contained the three-concurring-causes
doctrine of Melanchthon and the Synergists. As a matter of fact,
however, the Torgau Book does not speak of three causes of conversion,
but of three causes in those who are already converted,--a doctrine
entirely in agreement with the _Formula of Concord_, which, as shown,
plainly teaches that after conversion the will of man also cooperates
with the Holy Spirit. In the Torgau Book the passage in question reads:
"Thus also three causes concur to effect this internal new obedience in
the converted. The first and chief cause is God Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost.... The second is God's Word.... The third is man's intellect,
enlightened by the Holy Spirit, which ponders and understands God's
command [threat and promise], and our new and regenerate will, which is
governed by the Holy Spirit, and now desires with a glad and willing
heart (_herzlich gern und willig_), though in great weakness, to submit
to, and obey, the Word and will of God." In the same sense, at the
colloquy in AItenburg, 1568 to 1569, the Jena theologians also mentioned
as a "third cause" "the mind of man, which is regenerated and renewed,
and yields to, and obeys, the Holy Spirit and the Word of God (_des
Menschen Gemuet, so wiedergeboren und erneuert ist und dem Heiligen
Geiste und Gottes Wort Folge tut und gehorsam ist_)." (Frank 1, 214f.)